Le 21-oct.-06, à 21:52, Charles Goodwin a écrit :
> [mailto:Fabric-of-Reality.domain.name.hidden] On Behalf Of Peter D
> Jones
>
>> The problem is not that there are no such resemblances in a
>> Multiverse, it is that ther are far too many. How does one
>> distinguishing "real" ones from "coincidental" ones. How does a Harry
>> Potter film differ from a documentary?
>
> The only way I know of that the MWI distinguishes these is that the
> "measure" of the "real ones" is Vastly larger than the "measure" of the
> rest. But that is just restating things.
Except, I would say that QM-without-collapse + decoherence theory
explains the measure of the real one is vaster than the measure of the
Harry-Potter (HP) stories, and, as DD said himself, why the probability
to remains in a Harry Potter story is negligible.
In a a-la-Feynman nutshell: QM entails a phase randomization making the
HP story amplitude of probabilities self-destroying.
But now, most presentation of QM-without collapse assumes the classical
turing emulability of the observer. Then, (it is my main point), it
remains to explain why we are not confronted with the classical HP
stories, which, at least at first sight, have purely additive
probabilities and no phase randomization to eliminate the HP one.
The high non triviality of the classical turing emulability of the
observer hypothesis (computatiionalism), forces to justfify the
appearance of
(which btw remains true in the Hamerov doctrine where the brain is a
quantum machine, it is only false in Penrose doctrine where
consciousness is supposed to be both physical and non turing emulable)
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Sun Oct 22 2006 - 08:42:18 PDT