Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

From: 1Z <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2006 05:08:39 -0700

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
>
> > If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show
> > that matter is redundant,
>
>
> Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is
> true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to explain even
> just the physical laws (not to talk on consciousness).

Primary matter was never *supposed* to explain either of
those things. That is a straw-man version of materialism.

> > because if your UD doesn't exist
> > in Platonia,
>
>
> ... but the UD exists in Platonia. The ontological status of the UD is
> the same as the ontological status of the number 5.

Whatever that is. A purely mathematical argument can tell us they
have the same ontological status; it cannot tell us what that status
is. The question of what a mathematical existence-claim
means ontologically requires a philosophical argument.

> Peano Arithmetic
> can prove the existence of the UD.

The mathematical existence. Pure maths cannot prove anything
ontologically.

>
>
>
> > it doesn't exist in the material world either, so it
> > doesn't exist at all, and therefore cannot replace anything that does
> > exist.
>
> Actually an instantiation of the UD exists in the "material world" too
> (as far as the material world exists of course). The UD is just a
> prgram. You can see its code here:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/
> 4%20GEN%20&%20DU.pdf

But it requires infinite time to run.


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Received on Wed Oct 11 2006 - 08:09:39 PDT

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