David Nyman wrote:
> But this conclusion
> is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory
> role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite
> equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather
> to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or
> consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'.
>
> David
That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument.
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Received on Tue Oct 10 2006 - 20:26:17 PDT