Jacques Mallah wrote:
>> BM:
>> The measure is defined on the set of computations and gives the
>> relative probability of living such and such experiences.
>> It has nothing to do with the intensity of each experience.
>
> JM:
> No one ever suggested it might, ...
You are suggesting exactly that in your first 'zombie wives' thread.
you say:
<<According to the flow of measure claim, each
of these copies would have just one millionth of a normal human measure.
So these women would practically be zombies>>
If you agree that the measure has nothing to do with the intensity
of the consciousness of the mutiplied people, then I really don't
understand why the QTI (or comp-i) should entails existence of zombies.
>> BM: Nor does it work with Everett MWI. Your argument looks a little
>> like the argument against MWI from which it follows that Energy is
>> not conserved in the 'multiplication of worlds'.
>
> JM: Not at all. Obviously if there is no copying or killing (or
>birthing), we all agree that the measure of observers stays the same in
>the MWI (at least to a good approximation).
What kind of many-worlder are you ? The number of relative observers
grows super-exponentially in the MWI.
If you take a quantum computer + an AI program, you can put the AI
program in a superposition of having different inputs, different personal
experience, different consciousness.
Are you a bohmian 'many-worlder' (that would be coherent with a lot of
your
saying) ?
Bruno
Received on Thu Aug 19 1999 - 02:20:31 PDT