Of course, there is still an infinite number of 'near zombies' (a misnomer -
measure probably has nothing to do with how conscious you are) of all
persuasions.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Christopher Maloney [SMTP:dude.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Thursday, August 19, 1999 3:38 AM
> To: everything-list
> Subject: Re: zombie wives
>
> Sorry it's taken me a while to reply to this post.
>
>
> "Jacques M. Mallah" wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, 13 Aug 1999, Christopher Maloney wrote:
> > >
> > > I agree that the concept "that one's measure is somehow distributed
> > > among the so called computational continuations of one's brain
> activity"
> > > leads inevitably to the concept of near-zombies. The description of
> > > making a million copies of one person is a good illustration. Each of
> > > those copies has only a one millionth chance of "being" the original
> > > person, so we should not be as concerned when one of those dies as
> > > when someone else, who has never been copied, dies. But is this a
> > > refutation of the concept, by reductio-ad-absurdum? I don't think so.
> >
> > It is absurd to me and hopefully will be to the others. I think
> > you are not being objective since you usually find zombies absurd.
>
> I should have qualified my zombie view in the post before, but I forgot.
> If you re-read it, you'll notice that I always used the term "near-
> zombies". I certainly do find the concept of zombies absurd. But "near-
> zombies", as I was using the term, are physical SAS's that have a very
> low measure of existence. That is, any random conscious entity would
> have a low probability of finding itself to be that one relative to
> others.
>
> But "near-zombies" are not the same as zombies -- there is a qualitative
> difference between low measure and not conscious (zero measure). I tend
> to agree with Russell that it's difficult to see what measure has to do
> with consciousness.
>
>
> >
> > > I want to clarify one thing, though, in Jacques' post:
> > >
> > > "Jacques M. Mallah" wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Fri, 13 Aug 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > > > > > referring to
> > > > > > > t0 |
> > > > > > > |
> > > > > > > t1 T / \ H
> > > > > > > / \
> > > > > > > t2 / / \
> > > > > > > | | \
> > > > > > > t3 Y R B
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Assume that all three branches occur (two copying events).
> > >
> > > If there are two copying events, then there is no place for a coin
> > > toss to enter into the experiment, so the 'T' and 'H' should be
> > > erased from the diagram. The point is still made that, at time t0,
> > > Jane would figure:
> > > P(left branch, t1) = 1/2, P(right branch, t1) = 1/2
> > > P(Y, t3) = 1/2, P(R, t3) = 1/4, P(B, t3) = 1/4
> > >
> > > Which would imply that the two copies of her that saw red and blue
> > > would be less likely to be the same Jane at t0, so in some sense,
> > > they would be less human, you might say.
> >
> > In the QS claim, that is. T and H can still label the branches.
>
> Okay as long as T and H are just labels, and there is no coin toss,
> right?
>
>
> > The two experiments are actually rather different and I should
> > have made the distiction clearer in my post. I assume you refer below
> to
> > the case with two copying events.
>
> No, I thought I was very clear. All of my six "options" are alternative
> ways of interpreting the original experiment, with a coin toss, and one
> copying event if the toss lands heads. There may be a problem with
> terminology here, because if you assume the MWI, then the coin toss is
> a copy event. I do usually assume MWI, so I may have confused things.
>
>
> > > 3. Subjective probabilities can be computed, but the assumption
> > > that consciousness can "flow" to a continuation independent of
> > > time or space is flawed.
> > >
> > > This, I think, is Jacques' point of
> > > view. Though he didn't state it, I would guess that he would
> > > say that
> > > P(H, t1) = P(H, t2) = P(H, t3) = 1/2,
> > > and that the original Jane would necessarily feel herself to
> > > continue along with her original body. That is, if, in the
> > > above diagram, at the copying event after Jane sees Heads, we
> > > assume that the original Jane is the one who is shown the Red
> > > card, then Jane at t1 would say
> > > P(R) = 1, P(B) = 0
> > > The copy of Jane who sees the blue card is a new person, who
> > > was just "born" at the instant the copy was made, even though
> > > she has all the same memories as the original.
> >
> > That is NOT my position, though of course I think 'consciousness
> > flowing to and being distributed among continuations' is nonsense. I
> make
> > no distinction between a copy and the original; 'identity' is not a
> > fundamental concept. Each has the same amount of measure. For
> practical
> > purposes the distinction is useful, however. It's just a matter of
> > terminology in the practical use.
>
> Then I wish you would describe what you do believe. I am stymied in my
> attempts to make sense of it, and I have tried.
>
> Consciousness "flowing" is perhaps a bad image. I mean nothing more than
> that certain observer moments are related by some sort of identity
> function
> to other observer moments.
>
>
>
> > > 4. Subjective probabilities can be computed on the basis of the
> > > Strong SSA, and we get
> > > P(H, t1) = 1/2
> > > P(H, t2) = P(H, t3) = 2/3
> > > If this is the case, then I think we have to throw Tegmark's
> > > scheme using Bayesian statistics out the window. This option
> > > has severe metaphysical problems, though, in my opinion.
> >
> > I don't know what you mean by the above paragraph, but the
> > effective probabilities are correct if there are two copying events.
> The
> > SSA is the right way to do Bayesian calculations.
> > If the T-H split represented a non-MWI coin toss and was a one
> > time event, then P(H,t3) = 1/2. In practice those conditions would be
> > impossible to achieve even without the MWI of QM (e.g. in an infinite
> > universe) and P(H,t3) = 2/3.
>
> It's very simple, although I guess I haven't written it out in gory
> detail before. Tegmark's formula "for any mutually exclusive and
> collectively exhaustive set of possibilities Bi, the probability of
> an event A is given by
> P(A) = Sum over i [ P(A|Bi) P(Bi) ]
>
> I want to computer P(H, t3). Let B1 be (H, t1) and B2 be (T, t1), then
>
> P(H, t3) = P(H,t3 | H,t1) P(H,t1) + P(H,t3 | T,t1) P(T,t1)
>
> We assume in this option (4) that P(H,t1) = P(T,t1) = 1/2. Now, I
> maintain, and I really don't see how it could be otherwise, that
>
> P(H,t3 | H,t1) = 1 and
> P(H,t3 | T,t1) = 0.
>
> Some people have claimed that these relations do not hold, but I don't
> see what they could possibly be talking about. These statements say
> nothing more than that my memories are consistent -- that I can expect
> them to remain constant. If we abandon that, then all hope is lost!
> I wish those who claim this (Hal?, Wei?) would explain themselves better.
>
> So, anyway, we get P(H,t3) = 1/2 by Tegmark's formula.
>
>
> >
> > > 6. Subjective probabilities can be computed, and we should expect
> > > the nonsensical results
> > > P(H, t1) = 2/3
> > > P(H, t2) = P(H, t3) = 2/3
> > >
> > > This is what I believe is probably true. I think that there
> > > must be a sort of "reverse causality" at work, which would
> > > increase the measure of the right branch of Jane at time t1
> > > (the branch that sees heads, but before the copy is made).
> >
> > Nonsense.
>
> Whatever.
>
>
> >
> > > This still has Jacques' problem of allowing pseudo-zombies.
> > > If we switch to Jacques' example and assume two copying events,
> > > then the Jane on the left branch, at time t1, would have less
> > > measure than the Jane on the right (note the contrast between
> > > this result and the previous, where the Janes that were the
> > > product of the second copying operation were accorded less
> > > measure).
> > >
> > > But I don't see this as a problem. What I'm suggesting is that
> > > each human alive today has a varying amount of "measure". It's
> > > incorrect to assume that each person, when they are born, is
> > > given a single "measure unit". By my scheme, a person with a
> > > terminal illness with only a few days to live would have a
> > > very small measure of existence, relative to others.
> >
> > Huh? This seems inconsistent with QS and the specifics aren't
> > there.
>
> This is my "near-zombie". We should not expect to find ourselves in the
> body of someone about to die. We should not expect to land in the
> hospital any time soon with a brain tumor and only a few days to live.
>
> Now, note that this is consistent with QS. Just because the person
> doesn't have a strong likelihood of survival, he or she does have a
> non-vanishing likelihood, and will, therefore, necessarily find him
> or herself surviving, by some extremely unlikely means. That's why
> there's no such thing as a true zombie -- which would equate to
> a conscious entity with a zero chance of continuing.
>
>
> >
> > > I can't help wondering, often, why I find myself to be the
> > > particular human I am. Do you others wonder this?
> >
> > You are arrogant. I am not a typical human but see no reason to
> > suspect I could not be a randomly selected human.
>
> Tut tut tut. Why is it arrogant to wonder? The whole concept of the
> SSA is about wondering why we are who we are.
>
>
> > > One thought
> > > I've had (please don't laugh at me too badly) is that the fact
> > > that I have a pretty poor memory might be significant. If I
> > > had a better memory, then my measure would be less, because
> > > fewer universes could have given rise to me. Of course, this
> > > reasoning probably won't work for you, but that doesn't make it
> > > any less valid from my perspective, which is the only one I
> > > have.
> >
> > Well I hate (giggle?) to say it but that sounds stupid. If you
> > remember something non-random, that shouldn't cut your measure. If you
> > remember a random bit, it cuts the total measure of each type of you in
> > half but now there are twice as many types. By total measure I mean, as
> > always, the number, so this is consistent with the SSA and leads to no
> > zombies.
>
> But you said it yourself, if I remember a random bit, "it cuts the total
> measure of each type of [me] in half." I don't know what you mean by
> "type". I'd say it cuts the measure of me in half. That's exactly my
> point.
>
>
> >
> > > I came to believe in this "reverse causality" while pondering
> > > the QS project I wrote about before. I started to expect that
> > > things would crop up in my way to prevent my being able to
> > > complete the project, before it came to fruition. It didn't
> > > (and it still doesn't) make sense to me that the measure of all
> > > my branches should be unaffected until the very instant that I
> > > carry out the experiment. Because if the assumption that I'll
> > > be alive after the experiment date is correct, then I can expect
> > > to have memories at that time of somehow having escaped. And
> > > I should, in general, expect to have a memory of "the most
> > > likely" escape route, or of one of the most likely ones, if
> there
> > > are several that are near-equally likely.
> > >
> > > But how can one reconcile that with the concept of continuity of
> > > consciousness from moment to moment? Only if there is a reverse
> > > causality at work.
> > >
> > > This theory has significant and testable implications. Viz: we
> > > should expect to find ourselves in a universe that will allow us
> > > to live forever. I.e. this leads directly to the requirement
> > > that the FAP is true. Just consider if time t1 and t2 are
> > > separated by a larger and larger time span. Consider also that
> > > those branches in which we cease to exist also tend to decrease
> > > the measure of all the observer-moments in previous subjective
> > > time.
> > >
> > > Basically, the measure of our observer-moments at the next
> > > instant in subjective time are weighted as the number of
> continous
> > > paths from that observer-moment to the "Omega-point". This is
> > > my crackpot theory. Though it's certainly hard to justify on
> the
> > > basis of the SSA on a moment-by-moment basis (the Strong SSA), I
> > > haven't yet found anything that contradicts it. I know that's
> > > not good enough, but anyway I find it the most satisfying
> > > result of the above thought experiment. All the other
> possibilities
> > > are problematic.
> >
> > The Omega Point CRAP is disproven because the universe is open.
> > (CRAP=causally retroactive anthropic principle)
>
> Cute! But I thing the jury is still out. I probably shouldn't use the
> term "Omega-Point", since that refers to a specific theory of the infinite
> future evolution of the universe. I sometimes use it to refer in general
> to the infinite future in which life continues.
>
>
>
> > - - - - - - -
> > Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
> > Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> > "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> > My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
>
> --
> Chris Maloney
> http://www.chrismaloney.com
>
> "Donuts are so sweet and tasty."
> -- Homer Simpson
Received on Thu Aug 19 1999 - 02:14:06 PDT