Peter,
I am afraid we are in a loop. I have already answer most of your
comments, except this one:
>
>> Again, from a strictly logical point
>
> As opposed to ?
As opposed to the common sense needed for the choice of the axioms of
the (logical) theory.
To be sure I have not yet commented an earlier statement you made (that
we cannot identify digital machine or program with number). This is an
important remark and I will answer it soon or later.
Bruno
----- original message ---------
Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:40, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>> This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
>>> matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
>>> while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of
>>> comp,
>>> it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.
>>
>> If matter exists, and if consciousness is dependent on it, and if
>> there
>> is no actual infinities on which my consciousness can depend, then
>> that
>> piece of matter is turing emulable, and so by turing-emulating it, it
>> would lead to a zombie.
>
>
> The matter isn't emulable at all. Only its behaviour. if there is prime
> matteriality, and not just material behaviour, it is necessarily
> non-emulable.
>
>> OK then.
>> But now I have still less understanding of your notion of primitive
>> matter. You could define it by anything making comp false without
>> using
>> actual infinities, and this would lead to ad hoc theories.
>
> Only something with no properties is necessarily non-emulable,
> and there can be only one such something.
>
>> Again, from a strictly logical point
>
> As opposed to ?
>
>> of view you are correct, but then
>> we have to ask you what you mean by matter. It is no more something
>> describable by physics, and it is above anything imaginable to link
>> that stuff to consciousness.
>
> What is immaterial doesn't exist, and what doesn't exist isn't
> conscious.
>
> The link between mental properties and the bare substrate need be no
> different
> to the link between physical properties and the substrate.
>
>> Unless you present some axiomatic of your notion of matter, I am
>> afraid
>> we will not make progress.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
> >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Thu Sep 21 2006 - 05:51:57 PDT