Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

From: Colin Geoffrey Hales <>
Date: Sun, 17 Sep 2006 07:37:17 +1000 (EST)

Bruno wrote
> Colin Geoffrey Hales a 飲it :
>> 5) Re a fatal test for the Turing machine? Give it exquisite novelty by
asking it to do science on an unknown area of the natural world. Proper
science. It will fail because it does not know there is an outside
> And you *know* that?
> We can *bet* on a independent reality, that's all. Justifiably so
assuming comp, but I think you don't.
> Self-referentially correct machine can *only* bet on their
> self-referential and referential correctness.
> Bruno

I don't assume COMP. The idea that this is necessary to hold a position on
anything is, for me, simply irrelevant and preumptuous that COMP is able
to make any useful predictions. COMP is not an empirically supportable
position, no matter how elegant it may look. I would consider it so if it
could predict the existence and properties of brain material.

Having said that ....yes you are right that 'betting' on an independent
reality is all we can do....this is an empirical matter. Whatever it is
that enables vast legions of scientists to do their job (deines their
job), relentlessly for hundreds of years....that mutually eqisitely
produced, shared delusion called the natural world.... that thing... that
we appear to be within and constantly demonstrate it via creation of novel
technology that seems to operate within it.... That is worth betting
on...the process of consideration that it may not be there is of no
practical value.

But I'm not sure you have really 'got' what I mean by 'it does not know
there is an outiside world'. This is a practical matter. Brain material
does something special...which enables an internal literal phenomenal
mapping of the universe outside the scientist. The Turing machine is a
collection of abstractions with an ASSUMED relationship to the outside
world. Until we know what that physics is any argument assuming the lack
of that special physics is simply going to take you down the usual
argument path of assumption.

Only when we isolate the real physics of phenomenal consciousness in brain
material can we then make any valid judgement as to its necessity in
intelligence. Until then I hole all discussion based on assumption of
computational (as-if) substrates as invalid or at least interesting but of
little practical use at this stage.
The turing test always infuriates me. Since when does dumbing a human down
to the point of looking like machine X prove that machine X has
consciousness? I just don't get it.

When you give the machine that faculties of a human and make it do what
humans do ...I I believe getting them both to do science is the
appropriate ttest... then the Turing test is a complete irrelevance based
on an assumption that the presence of the physics of phenomenal
consciousness is optional in intelligence. It is an empirical reality that
when you alter phenomenal consciousness then scientific behaviour is
altered. No further argument is needed. The turing test is not a test of
consciousness. I'm not sure what it is a test of, but it is certainly not
a test of consciousness.


Colin Hales

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Received on Sat Sep 16 2006 - 17:38:32 PDT

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