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From: Jacques M. Mallah <jqm1584.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Fri, 13 Aug 1999 11:58:53 -0400 (EDT)

On Fri, 13 Aug 1999, Russell Standish wrote:

*> > referring to
*

*> > > t0 |
*

*> > > |
*

*> > > t1 T / \ H
*

*> > > / \
*

*> > > t2 / / \
*

*> > > | | \
*

*> > > t3 Y R B
*

*> >
*

*> > Assume that all three branches occur (two copying events).
*

*> >
*

*> > Gilles Henri wrote:
*

*> > >With the color cards, each Jane will measure subjectively a probability 1/2
*

*> > >of yellow, 1/4 of red (1/2 H *1/2 "being chosen as Jane 1") and 1/4 blue,
*

*> > >so again p(H) = p(T)=1/2 with the conditional probability formula.
*

*> > >The probability 2/3 is indeed the chance of finding someone who saw H after
*

*> > >the first experiment from a bird perspective, because duplicating
*

*> > >introduces a bias.
*

*> >
*

*> > I agree that according to the approach taken by the q-su's, namely
*

*> > that one's measure is somehow distributed among the so called
*

*> > computational continuations of one's brain activity, the probabilities
*

*> > would be (1/2,1/4,1/4). It is a history dependent claim:
*

*> > > t0 |
*

*> > > |
*

*> > > t1 W / \ H
*

*> > > / \
*

*> > > t2 T/ \H \
*

*> > > | \ \
*

*> > > t3 Y R B
*

*> >
*

*> > where W=wait to show the coin to her until the second copying
*

*> > event. Since she doesn't know when copying occurs this looks identical
*

*> > from her perspective, but the measure distribution is (1/4,1/4,1/2)
*

*> > according to the QS claim. Presumably this measure distribution would
*

*> > remain the same years later.
*

*> > I think this is already both ill-defined and anti-intuitive.
*

*> > To extend the example suppose that to counter the unfortunate
*

*> > demographic imbalance in China, someone figures out how to instantly make
*

*> > a million copies of Gong Li. According to the flow of measure claim, each
*

*> > of these copies would have just one millionth of a normal human measure.
*

*> > So these women would practically be zombies. It would not be
*

*> > justified to give them equal rights since they have so much less
*

*> > consciousness. This would remain true even as life experiences give them
*

*> > different perspectives and evolved personalities, some of them come to
*

*> > America, etc. I think this shows how ridiculous the claim is.
*

*>
*

*> No - it is a mistake to equivalence measure with degree of
*

*> concsiousness. Conciousness is either there or it isn't. Measure, does
*

*> however, indicate what history is likely to be observed (SSA). So an
*

*> interesting question to ask is what is the relative proportion of
*

*> heads and tails observed by Jane in a sequence. The probability of
*

*> being in a branch with 2^i Janes in the world, given n repetitions of
*

*> the above experiment is given by the binomial distribution
*

You misunderstand. First, the experiment I talked about is

different than the one with a coin flip determining whether to copy. As I

said,

*> > Assume that all three branches occur (two copying events).
*

in this one there are always two copying events and three Janes at the

end.

Second, no one said anything about degree of consciousness.

Measure describes the *amount* of consciousness. I should have said that

I was talking about absolute measure (not effective probability, which is

normalized by definition to obtain an effective probability distribution).

In the QS claim measure behaves in such a way. It's just the time reverse

of the QS process.

A room with 20 people in it has 20 times the measure of a room

with 1 person. But a room with 20 of these women would supposedly have

very small measure. For example, just as it is better to kill 1 person

than to kill 20, it would be better to kill 20 of these than 1 regular

person (all else being equal). In the limit as measure goes to zero we

have a true zombie.

Another example is that when a person comes into being, he

supposedly has a standard allotment of measure (1 unit). But suppose that

there already exists a being with very small measure such that the 'new'

person is a 'computational continuation' of the old being. (e.g.

one of the above women with particular life experiences.) Suddenly the

new person (supposedly) has very small measure! But if a parameter in a

model is adjusted until the old being (in this model) vanishes completely,

suddenly the measure of this new person (supposedly) springs back up to 1.

I don't think a QSer could get away with denying the reverse

process. There could be a cyclical process in which the number of copies

is varied periodically with time (with instant copying and killing

machines).

- - - - - - -

Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)

Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate

"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum

My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Received on Fri Aug 13 1999 - 09:03:56 PDT

Date: Fri, 13 Aug 1999 11:58:53 -0400 (EDT)

On Fri, 13 Aug 1999, Russell Standish wrote:

You misunderstand. First, the experiment I talked about is

different than the one with a coin flip determining whether to copy. As I

said,

in this one there are always two copying events and three Janes at the

end.

Second, no one said anything about degree of consciousness.

Measure describes the *amount* of consciousness. I should have said that

I was talking about absolute measure (not effective probability, which is

normalized by definition to obtain an effective probability distribution).

In the QS claim measure behaves in such a way. It's just the time reverse

of the QS process.

A room with 20 people in it has 20 times the measure of a room

with 1 person. But a room with 20 of these women would supposedly have

very small measure. For example, just as it is better to kill 1 person

than to kill 20, it would be better to kill 20 of these than 1 regular

person (all else being equal). In the limit as measure goes to zero we

have a true zombie.

Another example is that when a person comes into being, he

supposedly has a standard allotment of measure (1 unit). But suppose that

there already exists a being with very small measure such that the 'new'

person is a 'computational continuation' of the old being. (e.g.

one of the above women with particular life experiences.) Suddenly the

new person (supposedly) has very small measure! But if a parameter in a

model is adjusted until the old being (in this model) vanishes completely,

suddenly the measure of this new person (supposedly) springs back up to 1.

I don't think a QSer could get away with denying the reverse

process. There could be a cyclical process in which the number of copies

is varied periodically with time (with instant copying and killing

machines).

- - - - - - -

Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)

Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate

"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum

My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Received on Fri Aug 13 1999 - 09:03:56 PDT

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