>
> referring to
> > t0 |
> > |
> > t1 T / \ H
> > / \
> > t2 / / \
> > | | \
> > t3 Y R B
>
> Assume that all three branches occur (two copying events).
>
> Gilles Henri wrote:
> >With the color cards, each Jane will measure subjectively a probability 1/2
> >of yellow, 1/4 of red (1/2 H *1/2 "being chosen as Jane 1") and 1/4 blue,
> >so again p(H) = p(T)=1/2 with the conditional probability formula.
> >The probability 2/3 is indeed the chance of finding someone who saw H after
> >the first experiment from a bird perspective, because duplicating
> >introduces a bias.
>
> I agree that according to the approach taken by the q-su's, namely
> that one's measure is somehow distributed among the so called
> computational continuations of one's brain activity, the probabilities
> would be (1/2,1/4,1/4). It is a history dependent claim:
> > t0 |
> > |
> > t1 W / \ H
> > / \
> > t2 T/ \H \
> > | \ \
> > t3 Y R B
>
> where W=wait to show the coin to her until the second copying
> event. Since she doesn't know when copying occurs this looks identical
> from her perspective, but the measure distribution is (1/4,1/4,1/2)
> according to the QS claim. Presumably this measure distribution would
> remain the same years later.
> I think this is already both ill-defined and anti-intuitive.
> To extend the example suppose that to counter the unfortunate
> demographic imbalance in China, someone figures out how to instantly make
> a million copies of Gong Li. According to the flow of measure claim, each
> of these copies would have just one millionth of a normal human measure.
> So these women would practically be zombies. It would not be
> justified to give them equal rights since they have so much less
> consciousness. This would remain true even as life experiences give them
> different perspectives and evolved personalities, some of them come to
> America, etc. I think this shows how ridiculous the claim is.
No - it is a mistake to equivalence measure with degree of
concsiousness. Conciousness is either there or it isn't. Measure, does
however, indicate what history is likely to be observed (SSA). So an
interesting question to ask is what is the relative proportion of
heads and tails observed by Jane in a sequence. The probability of
being in a branch with 2^i Janes in the world, given n repetitions of
the above experiment is given by the binomial distribution
/n\ n
| | (0.5)
\i/
which has a peak at i=.5n, so we can assume by SSA Jane will see this
maximally likely outcome. She will see a world populated by 2^(n/2)
Janes, created by n/2 head events. There must correspondingly be the
same number of tail events. Since all these 2^i Janes have observed
the same history, this corrects the bias taken by sampling each Jane
independently.
>
> - - - - - - -
> Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
> Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
>
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Thu Aug 12 1999 - 18:04:46 PDT