Brent Meeker writes:
> > The actual physical process becomes almost irrelevant. In the limiting case, all of the
> > computation is contained in the manual, the physical existence of which makes no
> > difference to whether or not the computation is implemented, since it makes no difference
> > to the actual physical activity of the system and the theory under consideration is that
> > consciousness supervenes on this physical activity. If we get rid of the qualifier "almost"
> > the result is close to Bruno's theory, according to which the physical activity is irrelevant
> > and the computation is "run" by virtue of its status as a Platonic object. As I understand
> > it, Bruno arrives at this idea because it seems less absurd than the idea that consciousness
> > supervenes on any and every physical process, while Maudlin finds both ideas absurd and
> > thinks there is something wrong with computationalism.
>
> As I understand your argument, the manual doesn't have to be a one-to-one translator
> of states, and so it can "translate" from the null event to any string whatsoever.
> So the physical event is irrelevant.
That's right, the physical event is irrelevant, except that I can't quite see how to eliminate the
idea that "some physical object/process/universe exists" on which everything else can be hung.
FWIW, I actully think this idea is an argument against computationalism, even though I still think
it is the best theory of mind that we have.
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Sat Sep 09 2006 - 00:47:56 PDT