Re: computationalism and supervenience

From: Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2006 20:42:43 -0700

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>>>With physical supervenience, it is possible for the same person to
>>>>supervene on multiple physical objects. What is disallowed is multiple
>>>>persons to supervene on the same physical object.
>>>
>>>That is what is usually understood, but there is no logical reason why
>>>the relationship between the physical and the mental cannot be
>>>one->many, in much the same way as a written message can have
>>>several meanings depending on its interpretation.
>>
>>There is a reason: multiple meanings depend on external observers
>>and interpretations. But who observes the multiverse ?
>
>
> I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have
> made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer
> for its meaning. I agree, but *if* computations can be conscious (remember,
> this is an assumption) then in that special case an external observer is not
> needed. In fact, that is as good a definition of consciousness as any: it is
> that aspect of an entity that cannot be captured by an external observer,
> but only experienced by the entity itself. Once we learn every observable
> fact about stars we know all about stars, but if we lean every observable
> fact about bats, we still don't know what it is like to be a bat.

Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious-computation;
since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're thinking,
since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you allow
one->many) there is no way to know which is the correct map. There is if you and the
bat share an environment.

Brent Meeker


--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Sat Sep 09 2006 - 00:44:52 PDT

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:12 PST