About the prediction problem revived by Chris Maloney yesterday,
I agree it is a fascinating puzzle. Such puzzle becomes even more complex
when you allow fusing of people with the people's experience being
undistinguishable.
My answer is the same as Gilles Henri, I quote here:
>With the color cards, each Jane will measure subjectively a probability 1/2
>of yellow, 1/4 of red (1/2 H *1/2 "being chosen as Jane 1") and 1/4 blue ,
>so again p(H) = p(T)=1/2 with the conditional probability formula.
>The probability 2/3 is indeed the chance of finding someone who saw H after
>the first experiment from a bird perspective, because duplicating
>introduces a bias.
And Hal said what I think concerning the relationship with the MWI.
As I explain in my thesis you can transform 'first person subjective
probabilities' into sort of 'third person objective probabilities' by
duplicating the 'whole device' (including the bank for those who use the
betting approach for probability). And of course, in the MWI we are in a
situation where the 'whole device' is itself multiply.
Would it be possible that with the relative SSA we get Gilles Henri's
answer, and that with the absolute SSA we get the other one (all P = 1/3)
?
That would be a nice test, but I am not sure it works. I have not
yet a clear understanding of the absolute SSA.
Bruno
Received on Thu Aug 05 1999 - 03:35:53 PDT
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