Re: computationalism and supervenience

From: Russell Standish <>
Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2006 12:20:25 +1000

On Mon, Sep 04, 2006 at 03:33:33PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > I don't understand this, for in a Multiverse Klara is no longer an
> > inert system. Maudlin's argument relies on Klara being inert, or so I
> > thought.
> You are right. But in a multiverse Klara can be made inert too. Maudlin
> could have been much more clear and explicit about this.
> In the case Klara would be not inert due to the multiverse, and in the
> case this is relevant for consciousness, then it means that the level
> of comp has not been well chosen. It would mean that you need to
> emulate the quantum computation. You can do this with a classical
> universal machine. The computation PI that you get will be far more
> complex of course, but it is still a classical computation on which you
> can (re)do Maudlin type of argumentation, with new Klaras which will be
> inert in this case, as they need to be for the reasoning to proceed.
> All right?

I think what you're trying to say is move Maudlin's construction one
level up. The computer (eg Klara) actually emulates a Multiverse, and
Olympia is some kind of recording of the Multiverse. But in this case
I would say that Olympia and Klara are actually identical, and linking
the two is not of much conceptual value. I also have difficulty in
saying that a Multiverse is conscious when some interior views of the
Multiverse experience conscious states. It is the fallacy of assuming
that a collection of things is always more (complex) than the
individual things themselves. Multiverses are rather simple things -
about the simplicity of Schroedinger's equation, and hardly what I'd
call conscious.

But I think we are headed in the direction of whether computable
Multiverses really satisfy what we mean by computationalism. If
someone copies the entirety of reality, do I still survive in a "folk"
psychology sense. I am still confused on this point.

> This works also for analog quantum machine, unless they need *all
> decimals*, but then comp is false, and the UDA reasoning does no more
> follow;

I don't see that COMP demands the Multiverse be Turing emulable. It is
possible for conscious structures to be computable without the
environment also being computable.

*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
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A/Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052                      
            International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02
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Received on Mon Sep 04 2006 - 22:22:19 PDT

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