Re: computationalism and supervenience

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2006 15:33:33 +0200

Le 04-sept.-06, à 01:45, Russell Standish a écrit :

> On Sun, Sep 03, 2006 at 03:03:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Then Maudlin reintroduces the unused parts, the Klaras, which
>> reintroduces the counterfactual correctness, WITHOUT ADDING any comp
>> relevant physical activity (if not, it would mean the level is
>> incorrect(*)). So comp + physical supervenience (phys-sup) would force
> ....
>> (*) This explains also why, AT THIS STAGE, to move on a physical
>> multiverse would not help (Russell's Standish move), unless it makes
>> US
>> non computable, but that would be equivalent to abandoning both comp
>> and the quantum (given that quantum mechanics is quantum turing
>> emulable).
> I don't understand this, for in a Multiverse Klara is no longer an
> inert system. Maudlin's argument relies on Klara being inert, or so I
> thought.

You are right. But in a multiverse Klara can be made inert too. Maudlin
could have been much more clear and explicit about this.
In the case Klara would be not inert due to the multiverse, and in the
case this is relevant for consciousness, then it means that the level
of comp has not been well chosen. It would mean that you need to
emulate the quantum computation. You can do this with a classical
universal machine. The computation PI that you get will be far more
complex of course, but it is still a classical computation on which you
can (re)do Maudlin type of argumentation, with new Klaras which will be
inert in this case, as they need to be for the reasoning to proceed.
All right?

This works also for analog quantum machine, unless they need *all
decimals*, but then comp is false, and the UDA reasoning does no more
follow; but still note that the lobian interview will follow (being
lobian or "self-referentially correct" is a far weaker notion than
being a lobian *machine*).


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Received on Mon Sep 04 2006 - 09:35:35 PDT

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