Re: computationalism and supervenience

From: 1Z <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 04 Sep 2006 04:14:57 -0700

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent to the situation where every
> > > computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists implemented on some computer or
> > > brain in a material multiverse.
> >
> > But if implementing a particular computation depends on an observer, or
> > a dicitonary,
> > or somesuch, it is not the case that everything implements every
> > computation unless
> > it can be shown that evey dictionary somehow exists as well.
>
> The computation provides its own observer if it is conscious, by definition.

But "providing its own observer", if computationalism is true,
must be a computational property, ie. a property possesed
only by particular programmes. However, if any system
can be interpreted as running every programme, everysystems
has the self-observation property, if interpretedt he right way.

IOW, one you introduce interpretation-dependence, you can't get away
from it.

> If it isn't conscious then it's a matter
> of taste whether you say it is implemented, but trivially or uselessly, in the absence of an observer, or it isn't
> implemented at all in the absence of an observer. Conscious computations are the interesting case - if indeed
> computations can be conscious.



> > > The dynamism part can be provided by a simple physical system such as the idle passage of time.
> > > If you allow for parallel processing you don't need much time either. This leads to a situation whereby
> > > every computation is implemented by universe with a single electron
> >
> > What is parallel about a single electron ?
>
> If a physical system passing through a series of states in a given time interval can implement more than one
> computation,

Do you mean serially , or in terms of multiple dictionaries ?

> then it can be seen as implementing more than one computation simultaneously during the
> given interval.

AFAICS that is only true in terms of dictionaries.

But then you don't have a one electron universe....

(it is important to distinguish the idea that any physical system COULD
implement
any computation IF it were interpreted with the right dictionary
form the idea that it actually IS implementing every computaiton.
With hypothetical dictionaries, you have only hypothetical
computations).

> In this way, the number of computational states the system can implement can exceed the
> number of possible physical states (of course, if the MWI is true, you don't need this trick as there are always
> plenty of distinct physical states in even a very limited physical system).

There is an infinite difference (albeit a countable one)
between "many" and "every".

> Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Mon Sep 04 2006 - 07:16:50 PDT

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