RE: computationalism and supervenience

From: Stathis Papaioannou <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2006 16:42:28 +1000

Peter Jones writes:

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent to the situation where every
> > computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists implemented on some computer or
> > brain in a material multiverse.
>
> But if implementing a particular computation depends on an observer, or
> a dicitonary,
> or somesuch, it is not the case that everything implements every
> computation unless
> it can be shown that evey dictionary somehow exists as well.

The computation provides its own observer if it is conscious, by definition. If it isn't conscious then it's a matter
of taste whether you say it is implemented, but trivially or uselessly, in the absence of an observer, or it isn't
implemented at all in the absence of an observer. Conscious computations are the interesting case - if indeed
computations can be conscious.

> > The dynamism part can be provided by a simple physical system such as the idle passage of time.
> > If you allow for parallel processing you don't need much time either. This leads to a situation whereby
> > every computation is implemented by universe with a single electron
>
> What is parallel about a single electron ?

If a physical system passing through a series of states in a given time interval can implement more than one
computation, then it can be seen as implementing more than one computation simultaneously during the
given interval. In this way, the number of computational states the system can implement can exceed the
number of possible physical states (of course, if the MWI is true, you don't need this trick as there are always
plenty of distinct physical states in even a very limited physical system).

Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Mon Sep 04 2006 - 02:44:19 PDT

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