Re: computationalism and supervenience

From: 1Z <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 27 Aug 2006 15:53:41 -0000

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true random
> > > number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the former
> > > could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible, but I see no reason to believe
> > > that it is true.
> > >
> > > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> > I think this is what Maudlin's argument tells us. Is it that so
> > preposterous to you?
>
> It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is assumed to be
> preposterous, for no good reason.

An *obviously* determinstic machine would not pass a Turing test.

> I believe that I could have acted differently even with
> identical environmental inputs, which is what the feeling of "free will" is. However, it is
> possible that I might *not* have been able to act differently: simply feeling that I could
> have done so is not evidence that it is the case.

Pointing that out is not evidence against.

> And even if it were the case, due to true
> quantum randomness or the proliferation of branches in the multiverse leading to the effect
> of first person indeterminacy, it does not follow that this is necessary for consciousness to
> occur.
>
> > I thought I had another argument based on creativity, but it seems
> > pseduo RNG programs can be creative, provided the RNG is cryptic enough.
>
> Right, it's the complexity of the program that generates interesting and perhaps intelligent
> behaviour, not its randomness.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
> _________________________________________________________________
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Received on Sun Aug 27 2006 - 11:55:33 PDT

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