Russell Standish writes:
> On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true random
> > number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the former
> > could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible, but I see no reason to believe
> > that it is true.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> I think this is what Maudlin's argument tells us. Is it that so
> preposterous to you?
It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is assumed to be
preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have acted differently even with
identical environmental inputs, which is what the feeling of "free will" is. However, it is
possible that I might *not* have been able to act differently: simply feeling that I could
have done so is not evidence that it is the case. And even if it were the case, due to true
quantum randomness or the proliferation of branches in the multiverse leading to the effect
of first person indeterminacy, it does not follow that this is necessary for consciousness to
occur.
> I thought I had another argument based on creativity, but it seems
> pseduo RNG programs can be creative, provided the RNG is cryptic enough.
Right, it's the complexity of the program that generates interesting and perhaps intelligent
behaviour, not its randomness.
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Sun Aug 27 2006 - 07:33:08 PDT