Le 26-août-06, à 17:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
> A non-computationalist will believe that the Multiverse contains
> conscious processes (if they believe in a Multiverse at all). However,
> they may disagree that the Multiverse is Turing emulable.
No. A computaionalist has no reason to believe that the multiverse is
Turing emulable, given that it emerges from the sum of a continuum of
histories.
That is exactly why the computationalist has to justify the (apparent
or not) computability of the physical laws. Cf the white rabbits which
must be shown rare.
>
> Personally, I am open to the statement that the Multiverse is Turing
> emulable, even if each history within the MV is definitely not. Does
> the former statement make me a "computationalist"?
Comp is "I a machine". I have already explain why this makes doubtful
the physical universe is entirely computable. It is an open question if
the uncomputability is entirely restricted to the comp indeterminacy or
not. Below our level, it could be that the sum is "in average"
computable.
To be a computationalist is just saying yes to a doctor proposing a
digital brain substitution. It makes the universe computable only in
the case where "I am the universe" (unlikely, imo).
>
>
>> Now I have a problem with the assertion "the UD emulates the full
>> Multiverse".
>> This is because, a priori, with comp, by the UDA, the comp-physical
>> laws will emerge from the first person (plural) computations and their
>
> The comp-physical laws (indeed the physical ones) are 1st person
> plural things, and in themselves not Turing emulable. But the ensemble
> as described by Schroedingers equation [SWE] is deterministic and
> reversible. Why shouldn't this be Turing emulable in your scheme?
It could be. I hope it will be. But I cannot postulate the SWE. Open
question.
>
>>>
>>> So am I computationalist? On the most obvious level, no. However,
>>> considering the above perhaps I am Bruno's sort of computationalist
>>> with a very deep level of replacement (ie switching entire
>>> realities).
>>
>>
>> OK, that looks like what I was saying.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Confused? That would make two of us.
>>
>>
>> Ah? Why? You seemed quite coherent here ...
>>
>
> Confused because I don't think that switching entire realities counts
> as surviving the "Yes Doctor" experiment.
Mathematician like extreme cases. Switching entire realities can be
made to get illustration of very low level forms of comp. It gives comp
models of "quasi non comp". They are not the only one, because the
first person associated to the machine will be quite "not-comp" too in
her ways.
>
> I do actually subscribe to the view that it is possible to replace my
> brain with appropriately configured silicon & wires, but because of
> the Maudlin/movie-graph argument, such an artifical brain must be
> sensitive to
> quantum randomness. This is a non-computationalist "Yes, Doctor"
> proposition.
I don't think so. Well, it all depends what you put in the quantum.
Quantum randomness with comp could be just the MWI differentiation, or
something else. If you believe the quantum randomness is not generable
by a classical computer, not even by self-duplication (as opposed to
third person simulation), then indeed, it belongs to non-comp, but then
you are not saying yes to a doctor who propose to you a digital brain.
Or if you prefer: your "saying yes" does not amount for a complete
brain substitution, your brain here contains some part of the
environment, but that is not "saying yes" to the doctor for a brain
substitution, but only for a part of it.
>
> On a slightly incidental note, I was wondering your thoughts of a
> possible paradox in your argument. Since COMP predicts
> COMP-immortality, the doctor may as well make a recording of your
> brain and put it in the filing cabinet to gather dust, as you will
> survive in Plato's heaven anyway. Furthermore, you could just say "No
> doctor", and still survive through COMP-immortality.
>
> It would seem that "Pascal's wager" should have you saying "No doctor"
> (if the point was to survive terminal illness, anyway).
Come on, I have already insist on this. Understanding what really means
"surviving through the yes doctor" = understanding that, in *that*
case, we survive without doctor. It is the comp-immortality issue. In
general I add the picture that an artificial brain is just a way to
make longer the staying in the "Samsara", putting the "Nirvana" for
later.
Now people does not want immortality. They want just see their children
growing, or the next soccer championship. They search quality of life,
not quantity. And the comp immortality issue can make death still more
unknown, and that can only motivate some for making that Samsara
longer. The clinically immortal people, if ever, will not know what
they miss, of course.
We are talking at the G* level here, cautious. Many propositions in G*
(minus G) seems somehow paradoxical.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Sun Aug 27 2006 - 10:36:33 PDT