Russell, I know you're director of the High Performance Computing
Support Unit, but real computers can NOT generate random numbers, unless
they're hooked up to a radioactive source. (In the latter case, they can
generate numbers which appear random to us because we are uinable to predict
which branch of the multiverse we will end up in after any given
measurement).
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russell Standish [SMTP:R.Standish.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 1999 6:03 AM
> To: hpm.domain.name.hidden
> Cc: everything-list.domain.name.hidden; R.Standish.domain.name.hidden.EDU.AU
> Subject: Re: Fwd: Implementation/Relativity
>
> >
> > Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>:
> > > conciousness we experience directly ... generated by some kind of
> > > self-referential process ... is intrinsically a different to
> > > the Turing type tests we perform to attribute conciousness in
> > > external objects.
> > > ...
> > > nor do I think it a particularly useful way of
> > > thinking.
> >
> > But it is enormously useful for deciding whether to deal with
> > particular robots as conscious!
> >
>
> I don't see any problem in attributing consciousness to a robot that
> convinces me that it is conscious, in just the same way as I attribute
> consciousness to a dog. Animal consciousness such as a dogs only
> appear to differ in degree rather than in kind to me. On the other
> hand a supposed conscious rock would truly differ in kind, as the
> attribution of consciousness gives us no predictive power on their
> properties.
>
> I also agree with the idea that consciousness is a relative property,
> one that is in the eye of the beholder. In the eye of this beholder,
> "free will" is an essential property of consciousness, and its hard
> for me to see how a Turing machine could have free will. Of course, it
> is not necessary to construct robots from Turing machines, but most
> likely they will be able to simulate a Turing machine, as the human
> brain can do. I really suspect that the human brain is capable of more
> than a Turing machine can do.
>
> The simplest operation I can think of that Turing machines can't do is
> generate true random numbers (real computers can do this, albeit in
> usually in very kludgy ways). I'm not entirely sure that the human
> brain can generate truly random numbers either, but probably it
> can. This is why I speculate that the random number generator may be
> necessary and sufficient for "free will".
>
>
> > Yours isn't. Your quest already has a few centuries of western
> > philosophy of mind under its belt, and is no closer to finding the
> > objective qualities that constitute consciousness. Like the effort
> > to define the properties of phlogiston or the luminiferous ether,
> > it doesn't work because its subject matter is an abstraction that
> > changes with viewpoint.
> >
> >
>
> And you a proposing that considering rocks as conscious will help find
> these qualities too?
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
> Dr. Russell Standish Director
> High Performance Computing Support Unit,
> University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
> Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
> Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
> Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
Received on Wed Jul 28 1999 - 02:15:40 PDT