Re: Are First Person prime?

From: 1Z <>
Date: Wed, 09 Aug 2006 03:46:24 -0700

Colin Hales wrote:
> David Nyman:
> <snip>
> > > An _abstract_ computation/model X implemented symbolically on a of a
> > portion
> > > of the structure (a COMPUTER) inside the structure (the UNIVERSE) will
> > see
> > > the universe as "NOT COMPUTER", not some function of the machinations of
> > X,
> > > the model. Eg The first person perspective of a register in a computer
> > > holding a quantity N must be that of being a register in a computer, not
> > > that of 'being' a quantity N.
> >
> > Interestingly you see it as the perspective of the register, rather
> > than some computational entity within X. Does this imply some sort of
> > hardware/ substrate experiential dependency, rather than a purely
> > relational 'program-level' view?
> >
> >
> Sort of...but I think the word 'hardware' is loaded with assumption. I'd say
> that universe literally is a relational construct

A timeless relational construct or an evolving relational construct ?

> and that it's appearance
> as 'physical' is what it is like when you are in it. .ie.

Presumably, what is *necessarily* like when you are
in it , since there is no contingency in Platonia.

I await an apriori deduction of qualia from
relational structures....

> There's no such
> 'thing' as a 'thing'. :-) It doesn't mean that behaving 'as if' there are
> such things as things is not useful...we survive that way...
> 'Substrate' in my intended context would mean more like 'whatever it is that
> the universe is, it is that'. Our predisposition to assume isolated lumpy
> 'thingness' is rather pervasive.

Of course: it is well founded empirically. We have abundant
evidence that only certaint things exist within a given spatial
volume (contingency) that they endure through time, and so on.

Timeless universe, universes where everything that can exist
does exist, are not well founded empirically.

> Perhaps this:
> Waving a bit of it ('stuff', the relational-substrate) around in a circle
> (for example) in indirect 'as-if' symbolic representation as a computation
> of an abstraction X in no way instantiates X or Xness,

Why not? What *does* implementation consist of ?

> it instantiates
> 'being_waved_around_in_a_circle_ness' from the point of view of being the
> 'stuff' (1st person) and the behaviour 'waving_around_in_a_circle_ly' (3rd
> person). Note that the 3rd person is actually derived from the 1st person
> perspective of the observer! This third person can pretend
> 'waving_around_in_a_circle_ly' is X, but that's all there acting.
> The third person perspective is manufactured in the eyes of the beholder.
> Perhaps rather than '1st Person Prime' as an assertion, maybe '3rd person
> not prime' is a lesser and more justified position. The fact is that there
> is no such thing as a 'third person'.

Ontologically ?

> What you have is a communicable 1st
> person perspective that yet another 'first person perspective' can find if
> it looks. No-one ever has a 'third person' perspective.

Epistemologically ?

> Ernest Nagel named a
> book after it: 'the view from nowhere'. If 3rd person does not exist, then
> 1st person is all there is left, isn't it?
> Colin Hales

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Received on Wed Aug 09 2006 - 06:48:26 PDT

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