Re: Hofstadter Quiz question

From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon Jul 19 06:49:35 1999

Hi Chris,

Bravo four you courageous attempt to solve the holiday problem !
Well to be frank I think there is a much simpler solution, which does
not relies on something as sophisticated as the crackpot/mauldlin's
argument. I will tell you soon. I give you a HINT: Hofstadter
makes a very usual critics against Everett's MW idea, and in his
"A Converstation with Einsteins Brain" he shows implicitely
that comp should be
a similar target for the same argument (but don't realize it !!!).

Note that your solution is correct. But this is only understandable
for those who understands (and/or *agrees*) with
- the comp indeterminism (as I guess almost agree)
- the immaterialism implied by computationalism (not sure a lot
of people has seen this point).

The exercice I propose just show, in fact, that Hofstadter, has not yet
seen the indeterminism implied by comp.


---- Original Message ----

>Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> Holliday exercice : there is a proposition P such that Hofstadter
>> believes P
>> in his remark on quantum mechanics, and believes NOT P in his
>> "conversation" with Einstein's brain, (both in Mind's I), which is P ?
>>
>> Bruno.
>
>I think I found it, and of course it's related to your silly idea
>that either not "computationalist hypothesis" or not "physical
>supervenience".
>
>In Reflections on Rediscovering the Mind, p. 43, he says "... an
>important theme of this book, which is that nonquantum-mechanical
>computational models of mind (and all that goes along with mind) are
>possible in principle".
>
>In Reflections on A Converstation on Einsteins Brain, p. 459, he
>says "In this book there are a variety of thought experiments
>designed to explore the implications of the hypothesis that
>materialism is true: the mind or self is not another (non-physical)
>thing, in miraculous interaction with the brain, but somehow a
>natural and explainable product of the brain's organization and
>operation."
>
>So P would be "materialism" or "the physical supervenience thesis".
>
>Of course, Bruno, I still don't think I agree with your proof of
>the incompatibility of these two. Unfortunately I just have not
>had enough time lately to compose a thoughtful response.
Received on Mon Jul 19 1999 - 06:49:35 PDT