Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Holliday exercice : there is a proposition P such that Hofstadter
> believes P
> in his remark on quantum mechanics, and believes NOT P in his
> "conversation" with Einstein's brain, (both in Mind's I), which is P ?
>
> Bruno.
I think I found it, and of course it's related to your silly idea
that either not "computationalist hypothesis" or not "physical
supervenience".
In Reflections on Rediscovering the Mind, p. 43, he says "... an
important theme of this book, which is that nonquantum-mechanical
computational models of mind (and all that goes along with mind) are
possible in principle".
In Reflections on A Converstation on Einsteins Brain, p. 459, he
says "In this book there are a variety of thought experiments
designed to explore the implications of the hypothesis that
materialism is true: the mind or self is not another (non-physical)
thing, in miraculous interaction with the brain, but somehow a
natural and explainable product of the brain's organization and
operation."
So P would be "materialism" or "the physical supervenience thesis".
Of course, Bruno, I still don't think I agree with your proof of
the incompatibility of these two. Unfortunately I just have not
had enough time lately to compose a thoughtful response.
--
Chris Maloney
http://www.chrismaloney.com
"Knowledge is good"
-- Emil Faber
Received on Mon Jul 19 1999 - 05:05:28 PDT