On 14 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> Suppose that from time t1 to time t2, every circuit of the UTM are broken.
> Before t1 and *after* t2, for the sake of the argument, the circuit are
> working (some demon fix the UTM at t2).
> Suppose also that between t1 and t2 a bunch of cosmic ray accidentally
> supplies the faults in the UTM's working.
>
> Do you think there is consciousness between t1 and t2 ? (No, I suppose)
> Indeed, I guess that you will say that beween t1 and t2 the execution was
> not well-implemented (although here "not well executed" seem better).
OK; I would say the computation was not implemented.
> But remember that the UTM was well-implementing the brain.
>
> And now I make the *Maudlin's move*:
And I'll annul your alliterative argument.
> Add a physically inactive piece such that, in the case of a change in the
> neighborhood of the UTM, that physically inactive piece become active,
> and
> act as an automated demon fixing instantaneously the UTM, in the
> accidentally
> correct state let by the lucky cosmic rays.
> (That that is possible is showned in Maudlin's paper).
I take it that you mean that if the machine departs from it's
normal sequence, a switch will be triggered to activate a backup machine.
I think Maudlin's example used a false implementation, and I'm not
convinced that it could be done that way otherwise, but that's not the
quickest route to debunk the argument so let's continue.
> Now I tell you that there will be no change between t1 and t2 in the
> neighborhood of the UTM, so that the
> inactive demon remains inactive. Note that the whole setting is
> counterfactually correct and should, I think, be considered
> well-implemented,
> because "the correct-conterfactualness" concern the alledged turing
> emulability
> of the correct implemention (by construction) of the brain by the UTM.
OK, so you think the computation is implemented in this case.
> So your "correct implementation" whatever it is, as far as it is
> Turing-emulable,
> will fall in the Maudlin's trap, I think.
>
> MORAL : You cannot associate consciousness to the physical activity
> supporting
> a computation. (i.e. NOT SUP-PHYS)
I think the key word here is 'activity'.
I don't go around using the term 'SUP-PHYS', but it seems that
what you mean by it is not what I mean by physical computationalism.
Whether or not a computation is implemented depends on the laws of
physics and the initial conditions. Equivalently, it depends on the laws
of physics and the history of the system over time.
It is clear that in the two cases you described, the initial
conditions are *different*, and the history of the system is different.
In the first example there was no 'demon', while in the second example
there is a 'demon' and it moves at the constant velocity of the system.
That's why the argument is a straw man. Maybe (?) some people
once said that only objects that move in certain ways affect whether a
computation is implemented and Maudlin countered that, but I never said
anything like that. For me a stationary object is still part of the
system and it's perfectly OK if the computation depends on the position
and properties of that object.
- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL:
http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Received on Wed Jul 14 1999 - 18:21:43 PDT