Jacques M Mallah wrote:
(see
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/index.html?mID=899)
>On 9 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
>> Oh ! It could help me if you answer the following question:
>> Suppose you are right and you solve the implementation
>> problem (in your sense).
>> So you get a correctly implemented computer. This one is still
>> emulable by a Turing Machine, correctly programmed, OK ?
>>
>> The running of that Turing machine will, if I understand you,
>> be responsible for the presence of consciousness. OK ?
>>
>> What will happen, in this case, if a part of the machine doesn't
>> work, and if an accidental bunch of cosmic rays, supplies to the
>> non-functionning during some time. Will there still be
>> consciousness during that time ?
>
> It depends how important the broken part is. The rest of the
>computer would still function and the data from the broken part (supplied
>by the coincidental rays) would act as input. The human brain has several
>backup systems. If the broken part was big and of major importance, then
>there would not be consciousness during that time.
Well sorry. I haven't been clear enough. Remember that I suppose the
whole 'brain program' well implemented (in your sense) in a
electronical UTM.
Suppose that from time t1 to time t2, every circuit of the UTM are broken.
Before t1 and *after* t2, for the sake of the argument, the circuit are
working (some demon fix the UTM at t2).
Suppose also that between t1 and t2 a bunch of cosmic ray accidentally
supplies the faults in the UTM's working.
Do you think there is consciousness between t1 and t2 ? (No, I suppose)
Indeed, I guess that you will say that beween t1 and t2 the execution was
not well-implemented (although here "not well executed" seem better).
But remember that the UTM was well-implementing the brain.
And now I make the *Maudlin's move*:
Add a physically inactive piece such that, in the case of a change in the
neighborhood of the UTM, that physically inactive piece become active,
and
act as an automated demon fixing instantaneously the UTM, in the
accidentally
correct state let by the lucky cosmic rays.
(That that is possible is showned in Maudlin's paper).
Now I tell you that there will be no change between t1 and t2 in the
neighborhood of the UTM, so that the
inactive demon remains inactive. Note that the whole setting is
counterfactually correct and should, I think, be considered
well-implemented,
because "the correct-conterfactualness" concern the alledged turing
emulability
of the correct implemention (by construction) of the brain by the UTM.
So your "correct implementation" whatever it is, as far as it is
Turing-emulable,
will fall in the Maudlin's trap, I think.
MORAL : You cannot associate consciousness to the physical activity
supporting
a computation. (i.e. NOT SUP-PHYS)
SO WHAT?: Either, like Maudlin, you throw away the computationalist
hypothesis,
(and keep SUP-PHYS)
Or, like me, you throw away the very idea of associating
consciousness
to the physical activity supporting a computation,
(and keep COMP).
In that case you can begin to smell the need for the reversal. Indeed,
because
I keep COMP, I still associate consciousness to a *computation 1* and the
physical
can only be defined by the set of all *possible computations* sustaining
*computation 1*.
So here you divine how COMP forces both "relativity" and the "reversal".
And now, "my implementation" problem is showing there is no flying rabbit
next door.
(= explaining the "physical laws" from the possible inter-relations
between
computations).
SKETCH
Here I sketch how I proceed from there (I don't wait for an instantaneous
understanding, it's a rough summary of a very long journey):
Among the *possible computations* some will be more plausible (a greater
measure) and here "Kolmogorof---->Bennett" will intervene.
The "Kolmogorof---->Bennett" part of the measure problem is hard enough.
More easily, for the lazy philosopher, there is a short-cut toward the
squeleton
of the logic of that measurable space.
Just remember that
we must not really study the structure of all possible computations
sustaining computation1,
We should better try to figure out what can be said, logically, by a
self-referentially correct machine about those possible (consistent in
some sense) computations. (What I call jokingly making an interview of an
UTM).
Here my "Godel-Lob-Solovay-Boolos-Goldblatt-Smullyan" thread intervenes.
And it seems, with the theetetic definition of knowledge and observation
that the logic of the measurable space is a quantum logic (in the
van Fraassen labyrinthe large sense of Quantum Logic).
Here Russell Standish's cherished Hilbert Space ""come up"" in the
*universal interview* :-)
Bruno
I hope I will find the time to answer/comment to some interesting posts
by Devin Harris, Hal Finney, Alasdair Malcolm, and Wei Dai ...
Received on Wed Jul 14 1999 - 09:20:59 PDT