On 3 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> Nevertheless I am not quite sure we have the *same kind* of
> implementation problem.
> Roughly speaking you try to find criteria for linking consciousness to
> physical instantiation of computations.
Not so. I try to find criteria for linking computations to
mathematical structures, e.g. a physical world or another computation.
> What I say, is that if we take the computationalist hypothesis seriously
> then
>
> - 1) your implementation problem is necessarily insoluble ...
But this you have failed to show or even present a case for.
> We should explain for exemple, why there is no appearance of white flying
> rabbits ...
Which I think would require solving the (my) implementation
problem in any case.
- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL:
http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Received on Thu Jul 08 1999 - 15:17:36 PDT