In a message dated 99-06-28 20:08:06 EDT, Jacques Mallah writes:
<< James Higgo
> You say 'if A happens then B must happen according to the laws of physics'.
> Can you think of an example? Hume couldn't and I can't.
Jacques Mallah
Yes, it is trivial to find examples. Maybe Hume didn't believe in
determinism? >>
The hypothesis to prove true is "survival after QS". At first glance, this is
an impossible problem. As Karl Popper said, a "scientific" theory must be
falsifiable but can never be proven right. The only way to prove it is to go
through QS, but then the results of the experiment are not communicable. If
there was an easy way to generate predictions from the validity of survival
after QS, then I would say that the ball is definitely in Jacques court since
he is the one who wants to prove QS invalid. However, that would be unfair:
the nature of the problem is that the predictions made on the basis of this
hypothesis can only be verified by the experimenter and by nobody else (and
obviously we can't ask Jacques to do QS) We are pushing here the limits of
the scientific method.
The real issue is to make unique and objectively (not only by the
experimenter) verifiable predictions given the validity of survival after QS.
How do we do this? There are three possible outcomes that I can think of:
1) Either we can't generate such fasifiability and the whole QS issue becomes
like metaphysics or to be kinder like math. You can think and think about it
and generate many theorems and so on, but you' never know if it corresponds
to reality
2) Or we find a way to make predictions and we test these predictions. Of
course QS will NEVER be proven right. It will merely not be proven wrong.
3) Or we just go ahead and implement MW technology such as Quantum computers,
Quantum encryption, Quantum electronics, etc... I believe that with time
we'll become so familiar with the MW that we will just accept it as
completely natural. Arguments about survival after QS will appear to be
pointless, just like now, arguments about the existence of atoms appear
pointless even if no one has seen an atom with his naked eyes.
Engineering will succeed where philosophy has failed.
George Levy
attached mail follows:
On Mon, 28 Jun 1999, Higgo James wrote:
> Clearly, in the view that I and George Levy have put forward, there is no
> difference between Bruno's machine and an 'actual conscious person'.
> Consciousness is an artefact of the anthropic principle; every planck-time
> those universes in which consciousness has not, by chance, been generated
> and maintained, are simply not perceived. But they are the overwhelming
> majority. And yes, that means that the pasts we remember are chance
> configurations of our memory. But of course such a past does indeed exist,
> as everything possible exists. So you can justifiably consider it to be an
> accurate record of 'previous' experiences. If you so choose.
Are you a 'structuralist like Wei Dai?
> But I can
> imagine Jacques Mallah howling his terrible howl, rolling his terrible eyes
> and stamping around his room.
Gee thanks.
> You say 'if A happens then B must happen according to the laws of physics'.
> Can you think of an example? Hume couldn't and I can't.
Yes, it is trivial to find examples. Maybe Hume didn't believe in
determinism?
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jacques "Wild Thing" Mallah [SMTP:jqm1584.domain.name.hidden]
> > Sent: Friday, June 25, 1999 10:49 PM
> > To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> > Subject: Re: COUNTERFACTUALS
> >
> > On 24 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> > > Jacques W. T. Mallah wrote:
> > > > Suffice it to say, though, that whether the number of branches is
> > > >finite or infinite makes little difference. The point is you lose
> > measure
> > > >with a QS.
> > > >Some people in the multiverse have more measure than others,
> > > >and measure is proportional to effective probability. If you deny this
> > I
> > > >don't see how you can even explain why people descended from apes have
> > > >higher effective probability than those that form spontaneously.
> > >
> > > I do agree with the relation between measure and effective probability.
> >
> > Good, maybe there is still some hope for you. (Yeah right.)
> >
> > > >> [BM] The problem is that Jacques M Mallah is computationnalist. I am
> > afraid
> > > >> that this entails he has no other choice than to choose the relative
> > SSA.
> > > >> Only by choosing a strong physicalist ontological principle AND by
> > > >> choosing a strong (and rather mysterious) link between consciousness
> > and
> > > >> physical activity, will it be possible for him to get a "limited MW"
> > in
> > > >> which branching is absolute. Such a link between consciousness and
> > > >> physical activity has been showed incompatible with mechanism (by
> > myself
> > > >> in 1988, and independently by Tim Maudlin in 1989, precise reference
> > in
> > > >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal.
> > > >
> > > > [JM] Yeah right. I wanted to see this crackpot proof only because
> > > >(unlike QS) it does directly touch on my interests, but unfortunately
> > it
> > > >was unreadable. So what's the idea of the "proof"? In English.
> > >
> > > 1) I like very much your sense of humor, Jacques. Do you really believe
> > > that
> > > I will be clearer in English ? ... and without drawings, and without
> > > hands waving ?
> >
> > Oui, je connais seulement un tres petite nombre des mots Francais.
> > Vraiment, je peut ecrire une mal paragraphe, mais je ne peut pas
> > comprehende les mots des autres.
> >
> > > 2) Is it necessary ? This very discussion list, as we can realize by
> > > looking at the beginning in the archive, is founded on the idea
> > > (see also Tegmark and Schmidhuber, and (of course) Everett !) that
> > > allowing more [every] things to exist makes possible the isolation of
> > > more [the most] simpler [simplest] explanation possible. This, I think,
> > > means that almost every one in the list accept some kind of
> > > conceptually strong form of Occam Razor (as explicitely,
> > > exemplified by James Higgo). With such an idea, there is no need for
> > > eliminating HE. Any arithmetical (abstract) DU is enough.
> >
> > If you're saying we all accept the everything hypothesis, that is
> > irrelevant. I think there's a good chance it's true, but it must be
> > proven that it gives the right predictions. I assume for now that the
> > debate about QS is in the context of QM, straight Shrondinger equation.
> > Besides, you also said that the proof would show why a "relative
> > SSA", which I think is nonsense in any context, is needed.
> >
> > > The problem here is that the "physics" cannot distinguish a
> > > counterfactually correct firing of a neuron (for exemple) and an
> > > accidentally correct firing of a neuron.
> >
> > Sure it can.
> >
> > > For exemple, think that
> > > the neuron is broken and that, by pure chance, a cosmic ray supplies
> > > it in real time.
> > > Then, if consciousness supervenes on the physical activity
> > > of a digital computer (emulating a brain), it will be not difficult
> > > to show that consciousness will supervene
> > > on a physically equivalent device, at some level below our substitution
> > > level,
> > > where the device is build in such a way -by filming the computer-
> > that
> > > all "computationnal activity" will be purely
> > > accidentally correct (like in a cartoon where the dropping of a stone in
> > > a window is NOT the cause of the breakdown of the window).
> > > That mean that consciousness could supervene on something equivalent to
> > a
> > > filmed brain, in which there is no form of "physical" computation at
> > all.
> >
> > As you noted in your next mail, this has been discussed on the
> > list many times already. Such a device would not implement the
> > computations and would not be conscious according to computationalism.
> > That's it? So much for your alleged proof. There's nothing in
> > it. It just presents an example of a physical situation in which a
> > computation is not implemented, and claims that consciousness would not be
> > present in that situation.
> >
> > > This is basically the idea of the reductio ad absurdum.
> >
> > Of course Wei Dai does not find it absurd; his position is that it
> > would be conscious. I'd call him a 'structuralist'.
> >
> > ><< Hal:
> > >It is not enough, in this view, to reproduce an instance of information
> > >processing in a non-causal way.
> >
> > Right.
> >
> > >(My solution is, as I said earlier, that the question isn't meaningful,
> > >because it is at best another iteration of an already-produced
> > >calculation,
> > >and it doesn't matter if a conscious calculation is instantiated multiple
> > >times.)
> >
> > I obviously reject that.
> >
> > >If we accept that consciousness is a real phenomenon deserving of
> > >explanation, this view would require that causality is also a real,
> > >fundamental, physical phenomenon.
> >
> > Right, the laws of physics must exist in addition to things such
> > as functions.
> >
> > >But if the only way causality can be
> > >defined is as a relationship that spans multiple universes, it would
> > >follow that consciousness also must fundamentally involve multiple
> > >universes. >>
> >
> > Nope. Causality is easy to incorporate into a one universe model.
> > Any initial value problem obviously has causality.
> >
> > (Bruno:)
> > >I will make a detailed comment about that ASAP. I agree with Hal but not
> > >on the point
> > >"it doesn't matter if a conscious calculation is instantiated multiple
> > >times", where it seems I am closer to Jacques M Mallah.
> >
> > Good, that will help you understand QS.
> >
> > - - - - - - -
> > Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
> > Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> > "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> > My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
>
Received on Mon Jun 28 1999 - 21:12:58 PDT