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From: Gilles HENRI <Gilles.Henri.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Mon, 14 Jun 1999 13:58:56 +0200

*>
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*>Question remaining is the problem of identity fusing. How is this done?
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*>Identical minds are actually identical consciousness? By how much should a
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*>mind be different to generate a new consciousness? Is consciousness discrete
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*>or is it a continuum such that we share the same continuum?
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*>
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*>George
*

I think that it is indeed the most difficult point in MWI. In fact there

are not many worlds. There is a single, huge Universe containing many

apparent classical worlds. But what defines the "borders" of a classical

world? An apparent world is profoundly linked to the consciousness we have

from it, so this question is quite the same as George's one : what defines

a conscious state?

We could think of some set of projectors defining "quasi -classical"

states and think that the consciousness must be attached to some peculiar

classical states, but defining properly what is a quasi-classical state is

itself very difficult. It can only be defined "grossly speaking", so we

must admit that our own state is not precisely defined...I wonder if the

"pure computation" hypothesis would answer this problem, since it has also

to define which computations would correspond to a given conscious state

(and more generraly to any given quasi-classical world).

This is also strongly linked to the question of past and future, since

these notions make sense only for quasi classical states. Strictly

speaking, the number of past AND future states is infinite, because there

is a non zero probability of evolving from any quasi-classical

configurations to any other one. However, very tiny probabilities (i.e.

between very different macroscopic states) correspond also to apparently

temporally non-connected worlds. So if we restrict to temporally connected

worlds (by definition states for which the transition probability

calculated by QM is O(1))

Gilles

Received on Mon Jun 14 1999 - 04:58:34 PDT

Date: Mon, 14 Jun 1999 13:58:56 +0200

I think that it is indeed the most difficult point in MWI. In fact there

are not many worlds. There is a single, huge Universe containing many

apparent classical worlds. But what defines the "borders" of a classical

world? An apparent world is profoundly linked to the consciousness we have

from it, so this question is quite the same as George's one : what defines

a conscious state?

We could think of some set of projectors defining "quasi -classical"

states and think that the consciousness must be attached to some peculiar

classical states, but defining properly what is a quasi-classical state is

itself very difficult. It can only be defined "grossly speaking", so we

must admit that our own state is not precisely defined...I wonder if the

"pure computation" hypothesis would answer this problem, since it has also

to define which computations would correspond to a given conscious state

(and more generraly to any given quasi-classical world).

This is also strongly linked to the question of past and future, since

these notions make sense only for quasi classical states. Strictly

speaking, the number of past AND future states is infinite, because there

is a non zero probability of evolving from any quasi-classical

configurations to any other one. However, very tiny probabilities (i.e.

between very different macroscopic states) correspond also to apparently

temporally non-connected worlds. So if we restrict to temporally connected

worlds (by definition states for which the transition probability

calculated by QM is O(1))

Gilles

Received on Mon Jun 14 1999 - 04:58:34 PDT

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