On 13 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> >>Tell me if you agree at least with the weaker proposition:
> >> COMP + HE ====> immortality
> >>where HE is the (extravagant) hypothesis saying that a real concrete
> >>universal dovetailer (generating and executing all programs) exists
> >>in our "universe".
>
> > Jacques M Mallah:
> > Of course not. It's the same issue.
>
> I really don't understand you, Jacques.
At least we can all agree on that.
> I am afraid you are inconsistent.
> I am refering you to the thread "valuable errors" which begins at
>
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/index.html?mID=535
>
> More precisely,
> in http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/index.html?mID=540,
> you agree that you can survive with a digital body.
> And in the course of that thread you agree with what
> I call *mechanist or comp (first person) indeterminism* (because
> you told us that "for all practical purposes, a person who
> is copied should expect their future selves to be
> effectively randomly chosen").
> And you agree with the non-first-person-observability neither
> of any delays of "reconstitution", nor
> of the nature real/virtual of the reconstitutions. Etc.
Ok so far.
> But if you agree with all these points, it seems to me that
> "COMP + HE ====> immortality-from-a-first-person-point-of-view"
> follows quite easily.
>
> Remember HE is the Extravagant Hypothesis that there IS a
> non stopping, and never stopping, concrete program (UD) emulating
> all possible programs (this makes sense with Church's Thesis)
> in *the* uni-multi-verse. With HE, a universal computation is
> actually implemented in our (branche) universe.
>
> Even IF, by a kind of miracle, you would NOW be a sort
> of concrete real "Jacques M Mallah" belonging to that concrete
> universe, the next instant, you should expect yourself
> belonging to a virtual history generate by the UD
> working (by HE) in that concrete universe.
> And this happens just because, as you say "for all
> practical purposes, a person who
> is copied should expect their future selves to be
> effectively randomly chosen" among the virtual (at least)
> reconstitutions, which are ALL implemented, one day or another (but the
> delays are not first person detectable), and
> executed in the UD.
Still Ok, though I wonder if you understand what you're saying.
Practical purposes means decision making, and effectively randomly chosen
means there would be a measure distribution.
> Where is the error ?
Um ... what the hell did any of that have to do with immortality?
I'll tell you what - nothing. Only by looking at the measure distribution
can we find out about mortality.
> >[...] since immortality is observationally false,
>
> Come on Jacques, if you have experience death, tell us ! But in that case
> it seems to me that you survive, isn't it ?
> More seriously, I guess Russell Standish is correct
> when he says that,
> you confuse first and third person point of view.
> QM and comp immortality are of course *immortality from a first
> person perspective*.
> You cannot expect some friend surviving a big crash thanks
> some QM or comp tunneling effects.
I know what the "immortality" proposal says.
> But if comp (+HE) or QM is correct then, from your unique
> point of view, you can expect (and fear) personnal surviving.
> In *your* crash, you will survive
> probably in the *most normal near world* (may be in
> Stalnaker or Hardegree proximity sense) from the world you crash.
> This also entails you can expect being seriously injured ...
That's the crazy claim of you and your allies. You know full well
that when I say it's observationally false, I mean the fact that you are
not nearly as old as you should expect.
- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL:
http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Received on Fri May 14 1999 - 14:23:57 PDT