RE: consciousness based on information or computation?

From: Higgo James <james.higgo.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 1999 10:08:06 -0000

Bruno, eastern philosophers have denied each of the following and gone on to
greater things as a result:
Consciousness is private. This entails, by definition, an owner.
        Consciousness is subjective. This entails, by definition, a subject.
Consciousness is personal. This entails, by definition, a person
James

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Marchal [SMTP:marchal.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: 16 March 1999 09:05
> To: Shersy17.domain.name.hidden
> Cc: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject: Re: consciousness based on information or computation?
>
> Sherry wrote :
>
>
> >Just curious...you (= Bruno) wrote, in part:
> >
> > <<Only a person can be conscious.>>
> >
> >I am wondering..just when was that theory proven?...:-)
>
>
> I suspect y're jooking. But with the mail it is difficult to judge the
> degree of jokeness :-)... (If I can put it this way).
>
> What I mean is :
>
> Consciousness is private. This entails, by definition, an owner.
> Consciousness is subjective. This entails, by definition, a subject.
> Consciousness is personal. This entails, by definition, a person.
>
> I'm open minded, and I'm willing to attribute consciousness to a lot of
> creatures, from amoeba to extraterrestrian (if there is one).
> But in each case I attribute consciousness to some one, I recognize that
> ONE. And I call it a person. (not necessarily a human person!).
>
> So it is not a question of proof or theory, it is a question of vocabulary
> in philosophy of mind.
> You should perhaps read the very interesting work of Penfield(°), which
> illustrates that in all case of brain injury (even very severe one), once
> consciousness is present, then "kind of people" are there (even if the
> personnality is broken, wounded, multiplied, etc.)
> If you are willing to accept consciousness without an "experiencer" then,
> honestly, I'm not sure what you mean by the word.
>
> And that is why, although I agree with most of Wei Dai's propositions, I
> think he will not been able to convince, neither Jacques M Mallah, nor
> Gilles Henry, when he used expressions such as "a string can be
> conscious". This expression is too elliptical. I would say more cautiously
> that a string is enough to incarnate conscious being, or something like
> that ...
>
> Bruno
>
> (°) Penfield, W., 1975 The Mystery of Mind, Princeton University Press,
> New Jersey
Received on Tue Feb 16 1999 - 02:08:02 PST