FW: Misc.

From: Higgo James <james.higgo.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 1999 11:28:26 -0000

> I just read Schmidhuber's paper - I think it is 100% pertinent to this
> discussion and should be revisited in the light of the comments below.
> ftp://ftp.idsia.ch/pub/juergen/everything.ps.gz
> Essentially, the program that specifies all worlds is digital.
> A universe with physical laws is atypical but obviously we inhabit such a
> universe - weak anthropic principle.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gilles HENRI [SMTP:Gilles.Henri.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: 29 January 1999 11:22
> To: Marchal
> Cc: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject: Re: Misc.
> À (At) 12:16 +0100 28/01/99, Marchal écrivait (wrote) :
> >Put in another way : with QM you have many "worlds", but, a priori, not
> >as many than with COMP. With COMP I think we must justify, in a purely
> >non empirical way, why the vast majority of computationnal state we are
> >living seems to be quantum computationnal state.
> Bruno, that may be a big problem for your hypothesis (if I understand it
> correctly). If there are much less QM histories than computationnal
> histories, most of the computationnal histories are impossible or do not
> make sense in QM. But if our individual consciousness is a part or a
> bundle
> of computationnal histories, they most probably belong to those histories
> that do not make sense, if oyou vcan complete them with any possibility.
> So
> if we were a typical, randomly drawn consciousness, why don't we live in a
> Universe without physical laws?
> On the contrary, the (postulated) existence of physical laws can put very
> strong constraints that make the number of existing universes much less
> than the number of imaginable universes, and can be used to understand (in
> some sense) the properties of aour consciousness
> Cheers
> Gilles
Received on Fri Jan 29 1999 - 03:35:30 PST

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