Re: Misc.

From: Gilles HENRI <Gilles.Henri.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 1999 12:21:57 +0100

À (At) 12:16 +0100 28/01/99, Marchal écrivait (wrote) :
>Put in another way : with QM you have many "worlds", but, a priori, not
>as many than with COMP. With COMP I think we must justify, in a purely
>non empirical way, why the vast majority of computationnal state we are
>living seems to be quantum computationnal state.

Bruno, that may be a big problem for your hypothesis (if I understand it
correctly). If there are much less QM histories than computationnal
histories, most of the computationnal histories are impossible or do not
make sense in QM. But if our individual consciousness is a part or a bundle
of computationnal histories, they most probably belong to those histories
that do not make sense, if oyou vcan complete them with any possibility. So
if we were a typical, randomly drawn consciousness, why don't we live in a
Universe without physical laws?

On the contrary, the (postulated) existence of physical laws can put very
strong constraints that make the number of existing universes much less
than the number of imaginable universes, and can be used to understand (in
some sense) the properties of aour consciousness

 Cheers

Gilles
Received on Fri Jan 29 1999 - 03:24:17 PST