Re: consciousness based on information or computation?

From: Wei Dai <weidai.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 1999 01:03:08 -0800

On Wed, Jan 27, 1999 at 11:29:03PM -0800, hal.domain.name.hidden wrote:
> Conclusions and explanations are not so different. Explanations seem to
> be conclusions that are consistent with what you already know. Imagine
> if it were possible to make a new prediction based on the everything-
> exists hypothesis, something about the likely nature of the universe
> which had not yet been observed. Then if that prediction were confirmed,
> it would be dramatic evidence of the explanatory power of the hypothesis.
> This would be both an explanation and a deduction.

Yes, but the premise of you being a random selection can't be used to draw
any new conclusions because it is superseded by the information of who you
actually are, therefore it can only serve as an explanation.

> I do have a problem with the way explanations use probability. In your
> card game example, what happens when you are dealt an unlikely hand?
> What kind of explanation can the theory offer? If you are playing many
> times, you can say that the theory does give the frequency with which
> such hands will appear. But in life, it seems like we only play once.

But this is a general problem for any kind of explanation, right? There is
always going to be someone who is atypical and for whom the explanation
will fail. Nothing you can do about it.

> I look around the world and see that the vast majority of people are poor
> third-worlders struggling with difficult lives. I am fortunate enough to
> live in a wealthy country, have a good education, and tremendous riches
> by the standards of most people. What kind of explanation is there for
> this based on the assumption that I am a random selection from among
> all people? We can't run the universe again and let me be a different
> random selection next time. This is the same conceptual problem I keep
> encountering with this notion.

I also wonder why I am so atypical. But on the other hand I am not as
atypical as I could possibly be (e.g., I am not temporarily formed out of
bouncing air molecules). On balance the explanation seems sufficient.

> It gets worse if you consider not just me as a random sample from among
> all observers, but if you consider me-now as a random sample from among
> all observer-instants. Now it seems that I have to adopt an atemporal
> perspective where my consciousness dwells here in Hal Finney, 1999, for
> an instant, then jumps back to a slave in ancient Rome, then dwells for
> a moment in our bug-eyed alien. I can't make sense out of this.

I can't make sense out of that either. Your consciousness dwells here in
Hal Finney, 1999, period. It doesn't jump around, and it doesn't flow
forward (that's an illusion). On second thought maybe it's better to
preserve the illusion of forward-flowing consciousness and give up the
explanation for why you are who/when you are. Having to say "I have no
explanation" isn't *that* bad. On the other hand if you're willing to give
up the illusion that the universe is not completely deterministic, you may
be willing to give up this one too, at least intellectually.

> This view is especially perplexing if my measure changes drastically
> over time. With some of our thought experiments, I could boost the
> measure of an instant of my consciousness by making copies of my brain
> state (say, a high-resolution X-ray). But the next instant, my measure
> drops again. Would I somehow expect to notice myself spending more
> time in that amplified instant? Suppose I spent half my days with a
> big brain and half my days with a small brain. Am I to be puzzled on
> those days I am in the small brain, faced with the mystery of why I am
> not experiencing the measure-enhanced big-brain days?

Perhaps, but you should also be comforted by the thought that you're not
having the experiences of someone formed out of bouncing air molecules.
You have to keep in mind that you can't directly experience your measure.
It's kind of like you can't tell if I were to gradually replace your
neurons with neuron-simulator chips.

> This is related to the quantum immortality question. As time goes on,
> my measure becomes less. But it is hard to understand what I should
> expect to experience as a result of this.

It depends on whether you want to preserve the illusion of forward-flowing
consciousness. If you don't, then you should expect to (I) experience
exactly what you are experiencing right now. If you do, then you have to
figure out how this flow actually works. There are two possibilities:
either (IIa) some (most) threads terminate or converge into null
experiences (corresponding to unconsciousness), or (IIb) that doesn't
happen (maybe the threads merge somehow). In the first case you should
expect to experience nothing. In the second case you should expect to
experience immortality.

(IIb) is probably most appealing to most people, but I prefer (on an
intellectual level) (I) because it is simplest.
Received on Thu Jan 28 1999 - 01:07:02 PST