Hi Bruno,
>>According to my conception of spirit, at any level our choices are not
fully
>>determinated by the approximative laws corresponding to this level, so we
>>exist, but the more the level is deep, the more we "become small".
>
>So what ? If at any level we are not determined, then the only thing you
>will get is a kind of pure and objective randomness. But I think there is
>less room for free-will with randomness than with anything else. A random
>choice is not at all a free choice.
No, it's not randomness, because what is not determinated at one level is
determinated at a deeper level, at which something else is not determinated,
so at this deeper level we are still not fully determinated.
>>This made Bruno say that paradoxically my conception is more determinist
>>than his conception, because in my conception we cannot find such a level
>>below L in which the reality is not determinated.
>>According to Bruno, the world is less determinated than the spirit.
>
>If we interpret the word "world" as a relative machine dream (or
>history), and if we interpret spirit by arithmetical truth : then I agree
>with you.
>I am not sure you are willing to accept these interpretations. Please
>tell me.
I would rather say that the world is what the spirit perceives and acts on,
and the spirit is what perceives and acts on the world, but your
interpretations are interesting. There could be a relation between my idea
of infinite sequence of theories converging toward the real world and from
which the spirit emerges, and the idea of transfinite iteration of
reflection principle which converges toward the arithmetical truth (see
http://www.byoc.com/homepage/134885/text/logic/logrefl6.htm), both sequences
being not mechanizable. Apparently, this seems to contradict your idea of
mechanism, but I think I begin to understand the subtleties of your ideas :
>"completely" not in the logical sense, but in a "Shannon" or
>code-theoretical sense, like a Xerox machine don't need an understanding
>of the bible to make a copy of it.
>I don't need a complete theory of "me". I doubt there is any ... (with
>mechanism there are provably no such complete theory of "me" or "you", or
>any universal computing machine).
>Don't forget that I showed (or at least intended to show) that if there
>is a level at which I can be duplicated, I can never prove or communicate
>correctly that I know that level. So with mechanism there is no (in any
>provable way) such level (although it exists, by definition with Mech in
>a highly non constructive sense of "exist").
Jacques.
==========================
Jacques Bailhache
Y2K Centre of Expertise (BRO)
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Received on Mon Jan 25 1999 - 06:41:57 PST