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From: Wei Dai <weidai.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 00:43:58 -0800

On Mon, Jan 18, 1999 at 07:53:57PM -0500, Jacques M Mallah wrote:

*> However, the whole problem with trying to determine when a
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*> computation is implemented (or instantiated as you call it) is precisely
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*> that we don't have a definition of when a physical system contains the
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*> proper information. Implementation has two critera: a mapping to formal
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*> states must have the correct causal relationships (which is trivial for a
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*> system which is an initial value problem) and it must be true to the
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*> information structure (e.g. index labeling) of the formal states.
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A definition of when a physical system contains some information may not

be necessary. If the measure of a conscious experience is related to the

measure of the associated state information, then all we need is a measure

on the set of all possible states. We can simply say that the universe is

this measure, and any perceived physical systems are just illusions

produced by our own minds. Similarly, if the measure of a conscious

experience is related to the measure of the associated computation, then

it would suffice to have a measure on the set of all possible

computations.

So maybe we should work in the opposite direction. Instead of

trying to determine what computations a physical system implements or what

information a physical system contains, we should take the consciousness

measure (definied either by a measure on states or by a measure on

computations) as a given try to figure out what kind of physical system

one should expect to perceive.

Received on Tue Jan 19 1999 - 00:45:23 PST

Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 00:43:58 -0800

On Mon, Jan 18, 1999 at 07:53:57PM -0500, Jacques M Mallah wrote:

A definition of when a physical system contains some information may not

be necessary. If the measure of a conscious experience is related to the

measure of the associated state information, then all we need is a measure

on the set of all possible states. We can simply say that the universe is

this measure, and any perceived physical systems are just illusions

produced by our own minds. Similarly, if the measure of a conscious

experience is related to the measure of the associated computation, then

it would suffice to have a measure on the set of all possible

computations.

So maybe we should work in the opposite direction. Instead of

trying to determine what computations a physical system implements or what

information a physical system contains, we should take the consciousness

measure (definied either by a measure on states or by a measure on

computations) as a given try to figure out what kind of physical system

one should expect to perceive.

Received on Tue Jan 19 1999 - 00:45:23 PST

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