Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
> >emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
> >explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working
> >hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non computationalist.
>
> Why would Chalmers' version of dualism be non-computationalist?
That would depend on whether you are dealing with
consciousness-is-computation computationalism
or cognition-is-computation computationalism.
> As I
> understand him, he does argue that there is a one-to-one relationship
> between computations and conscious experiences,
But not an identity relationship.
> and he certainly believes
> that a sufficiently detailed simulation of a brain would *behave* just like
> the original.
But that is underpinned by psychophysical laws, not identity.
> Anyway, without tying my argument to closely to Chalmers' beliefs, what I
> meant when I talked about "psychophysical laws" was just a rule for deciding
> when a copy of a particular computation has been instantiated physically,
> with each instantiation contributing to the total measure of that
> computation.
What Chalmers means is something much more metaphysical.
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Received on Thu Jul 20 2006 - 17:34:44 PDT