Re: Bruno's argument

From: Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2006 22:10:34 +0200

Le Lundi 17 Juillet 2006 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> You mean that since you can't know which computation generates your present
> moment, you also can't point to which computer is generating that
> computation.

Worst than that, there is no computation that contains you, but an infinity of
them... the problem is not to point, there is nothing to point.

> That makes sense, assuming the UD is running and your
> consciousness is a result of the UD. On the other hand, if your
> consciousness is the result of physical processes in a single human brain,
> you *can* point to the computer.

When you mean computer, do you mean turing machine ?
Do you mean consciousness is a program ? thus it could be duplicated and run
at infinity (or a big number of times ;). Which part (instance) of this
infinity/big running of the same program are you then ? Your current moment
is not part of a single possible logical history... There are many past and
many future from the present with this view and so many programs who go
through your state.
Another thing if consciousness is a program/computation :
Imagine I run the program for 5 minutes, make a memory dump, continue the
running from the dump on another machine for 5 minutes and so on... When I
change machine it takes times... do you thing you're dead in between ? that
you could be aware of any delays, of the number of instance running the same
computation ? Then how could you say that these 5 minutes of your life was
this computation on this machine, and not any machine which have come to go
through exactly this state ?

Regards,
Quentin

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Received on Mon Jul 17 2006 - 16:11:03 PDT

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