Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Dear Quentin et al,
>
> I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm
> itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for
> mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation
> in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that can
> be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have.
>
> AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any
> property, including properties that involve some notion of chance.
The existence of some (abstract, theoretical, hypothetical)
thing involves all the properties associated (theoretically)
with it. The existence of a camel entails the existence
if a hump. The existence of a unicorn would entail the
existence of a horn.
>First of
> all *existence* is *not* a property of, or a predicate associable with, an
> object as Kant, Frege and Russell, et all argued well.
>
> http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Existence
>
>
> Per the Wiki article, Miller argued that existence is indeed a predicate
> "since it individuates its subject by being its bounds" [from the above web
> reference] but it seems that Miller's claim disallows any kind of
> relationship between such things (using that word loosely) as algorithms and
> thus denies us a mean to distinguish one algorithm from another. If
> Existence individuates an entity by "being its bounds" then it seems to
> follow that any other entity does not *exist* to it and thus no relationship
> between entities can obtain.
> I admit that I have not read enough of Miller's work to see if he deals
> with this problem that I see in his reasoning (as applied here), but
> nevertheless the basic proposal that existence is sufficient to obtain
> anything that is even close to a notion of implementation.
>
> also see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/
>
> Implementation is a *process*, and as such we have to deal with the
> properties that are brought into our thinking on this.
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> BTW, Plato never gave an explanation that I have seen of how the Forms "cast
> imperfect shadows" or even why such "shadow casting" was necessary...
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Quentin Anciaux" <quentin.anciaux.domain.name.hidden>
> To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
> Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:06 PM
> Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
>
>
>
> Hi Hal,
>
> Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit :
> > What, after all, do these principles mean? They say that the
> > implementation substrate doesn't matter. You can implement a person
> > using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same. But if there is no way
> > in principle to tell whether a system implements a person, then this
> > philosophy is meaningless since its basic assumption has no meaning.
> > The MWI doesn't change that.
>
> That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that
> physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision, there
> is no real "instantiation" even the UD itself does not need to be
> instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary.
>
> Quentin
Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Lee,
>
> I have no qualms with your point here, but it seems that we have skipped
> past the question that I am trying to pose: Where does distinguishability
> and individuation follow from the mere existence of Platonic Forms, if
> "process" is merely a "relation" between Forms (as Bruno et al claim)?!
>
> In my previous post I tried to point out that *existence* is not a
> first-order (or n-th order) predicate and thus does nothing to distinguish
> one Form, Number, Algorithm, or what-have-you from another.
Things that physically exist , exist in specific spatio-temporal
locations. the fact that something exists in this place rather
than that place is indeed a fact over and above the intrinisc
properties
of the thing.
> The property of
> individuation requires some manner of distinguishability of one "thing",
> "process", etc. from another. Mere existence is insufficient.
> We are tacitly assuming an observer or something that amounts to the
> same thing any time we assume some 3rd person PoView and such is required
> for any coherent notion of distinguishability to obtain and thus something
> "to whom" existence means/affects.
>
> We can go on and on about relations between states, numbers, UDs, or
> whatever, but unless we have a consistent way to deal with the source of
> individuation and thus distinguishability, we are going nowhere...
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
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Received on Thu Jul 06 2006 - 17:48:24 PDT