Re: A calculus of personal identity

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Sun, 2 Jul 2006 16:17:28 +0200

Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:59, James N Rose a écrit :

> Math and reductive science ignore and dis-consider collateral
> co-extancy.

The comp assumption leads to the less reductive possible account of the
person and person POVs.
For example, comp does not guaranties *any* survival, but it guaranties
  that no such survival-guaranties are possible. It guaranties
eventually that personal identity can only be a matter of ...
*personal* matter.

Perhaps are you confusing math before and after
Post-Turing-Church-Godel-Lob ...

... or you refer to those mathematicians who have not yet swallow the
incompleteness phenomena...

Actually I believe that the incompleteness theorem (especially with
comp or weaker) makes it impossible for science, or better, for the
scientific attitude, to be reductive. With comp the diagonalization
tale is before all a lesson of modesty.

Despite this, Goel's incompleteness theorem is a constructive theorem,
and it leads to the discovery that "machine ignorance" is wonderfully
structured, rich, productive ...
And UDA justifies why the laws of physics comes from there, in a
testable way.

To assume our finiteness, what comp really is about, enlarges the range
of our possible infinite realms. With comp only the gods can miss the
unconceivable freedom. Somehow.


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Received on Sun Jul 02 2006 - 10:18:35 PDT

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