Re: A calculus of personal identity

From: Brent Meeker <>
Date: Sat, 01 Jul 2006 11:04:39 -0700

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 30-juin-06, à 20:43, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>There is no false 1-memories. Only an association between some
>>1-memory and some 3-reality can be false. If someone succeeds in
>>implementing correctly (more than just coherently) false beliefs (like
>>I am Napoleon just after Waterloo), then I will believe correctly that
>>I am Napoleon and that I have just lose a battle, almost by
>>definition. I will have to go in an asylum, sure, but my
>>1-memory of the past is correct given that they have been correctly
>>What does "correctly implemented" mean? Doesn't it reference some 3rd
>>person standard of "correct"?
> Yes. Like in a plane with an altimeter telling the plane is 1 miles
> above the sea, when the plane actually *is* 1 miles above the sea
> (with respect to its most probable relative computation history).
> "Correctly implemented" means---assuming comp and thus assuming the
> existence of the substitution level---that the doctor has luckily
> implemented the "Napoleon's software" at that correct level (or below).

This seems circular - "correctly implemented" means a the "correct level (or below)". Suppose the
implementation caused Napoleon-2 to believe he had just won the Battle of Waterloo. That is a
conflict which seems to imply an incorrect implementation. But is it incorrect because of the
historical fact that he lost, or because of the 1st person fact that Napoleon-1 didn't believe he
had won. Suppose Napoleon-1 did believe he had won?

Brent Meeker

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Received on Sat Jul 01 2006 - 14:05:44 PDT

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