Brent Meeker writes:
> > Is the duplication process good enough to match or better the mechanisms naturally in place to> > preserve the functional integrity of the brain from moment to moment? That is the question that> > needs to be answered. It would be unreasonable to speculate that the duplicate may not be the> > same person as the original based on some test which, if applied consistently, might also cast> > doubt on whether we are still the same person from moment to moment in ordinary life. Putting it> > differently, maybe we *aren't* the same person from moment to moment: maybe we are constantly> > dying, to be replaced by a close, but necessarily imperfect copy. After all, nature will not> > evolve a system to perfectly preserve mental attributes throughout life just because such an> > arrangement is aesthetically pleasing. Preservation of the majority of memories, personality,> > other learned and instinctive behaviours, and a *belief* that we are the same person throughout> > life so that we will plan for our future well-being are the only qualities that evolution could> > act on. Since our brains are being continuously rebuilt at considerable metabolic expense, any> > subtle mental quality that has no effect on behaviour would be ruthlessly pared away by> > evolution's razor.> > Well, only assuming there is some evolutionary cost to them. There might be lots of what Gould > called 'spandrels'. But what I'm wondering is whether the *belief* that we're the same person is > some wholistic property of the brain or is it just some small module. If the latter then it seems > possible the duplicate could have all the other attributes, but lack that belief. This seems > perfectly plausible, since I can have doubts about other things why not doubt I'm me?
A "spandrel" must not only be benign, it must also be a side-effect of some other positive evolutionary benefit, otherwise in the long run it will fade away into the genetic noise. Regardless, it is possible that the sense of personality identity is some complex and delicate property of the brain which might be difficult to capture in duplication even if everything else is apparently intact. Well, all that means is that it would be technically difficult to achieve an identity-preserving duplication. Is there any reason to think this would be a different kind of difficulty to the difficulty involved in duplicating any other mental quality?
There are another couple of positions on this question which have been expressed at one time or another by other list members. One is the traditional dualist view, that despite perfect physical duplication, and despite the duplicate behaving like the original, what has in fact been created is a zombie. The other position is that despite perfect physical *and* as a consequence perfect mental duplication, the subject has still not survived (as he would have survived in ordinary life). The first of these I merely disagree with, but the second I find incoherent.
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Tue Jun 27 2006 - 08:49:29 PDT