Re: A calculus of personal identity

From: George Levy <glevy.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 24 Jun 2006 11:52:57 -0700

Bruno Marchal wrote:

>Le 23-juin-06, à 07:29, George Levy a écrit :
>
>
>
>>In Bruno's calculus what are the invariances? (Comment on Tom Caylor's
>>post)
>>
>>
>
>
>Logicians, traditionally, are interested in deduction invariant with
>respect of the interpretation. A typical piece of logic is that: from
>"p & q" you can infer "p". And the intended meaning of this, is that
>that deduction is always valid: it does not depend of the
>interpretations of "p" and "q".
>
>Those who remember the Kripke semantics of the modal logical systems
>remember perhaps that a logical theory is an invariant for the trip
>from world to world when accessible, making the theorems true in all
>(locally and currently perhaps) accessible worlds.
>
>

I suggest the following invariances which are possibly identical to the
above statement about Kripke semantic, but have a more "physical" point
of view. They may also be related to Church's thesis:
1) Invariance in the perception of one's own consciousness with changes
in the substrate implementation : "Yes doctor" I agree that a prosthesis
of part of my brain will not affect my consciousness.
2) Invariance in the perception of one's own consciousness with the MW
branching: Bruno in Washington will feel just like Bruno in Moscow
except for his perception of the environment.
3) Invariance in the laws of physics with substrate implementation:
simulation performed on different computers are indistinguishable if
they perform the same algorithms or functions. (Note that Invariance in
the laws of physics is a general relativity postulate.)
4) Invariance in the laws of physics with MW branching: This invariance
may be grounded in the requirement that consciousness must require
physics with consistent histories and the absence of white rabbits....

Notice the parallel between consciousness and the laws of physics.


George


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Received on Sat Jun 24 2006 - 14:54:05 PDT

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