Dear Stephen,
What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a
predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate.
Now "implementation" is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be
just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia.
Bruno
Le 22-juin-06, à 00:50, Stephen Paul King a écrit :
>
> Dear Quentin et al,
>
> I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm
> itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned
> for
> mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an
> implementation
> in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of
> that can
> be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have.
>
> AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any
> property, including properties that involve some notion of chance.
> First of
> all *existence* is *not* a property of, or a predicate associable
> with, an
> object as Kant, Frege and Russell, et all argued well.
>
> http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Existence
>
>
> Per the Wiki article, Miller argued that existence is indeed a
> predicate
> "since it individuates its subject by being its bounds" [from the
> above web
> reference] but it seems that Miller's claim disallows any kind of
> relationship between such things (using that word loosely) as
> algorithms and
> thus denies us a mean to distinguish one algorithm from another. If
> Existence individuates an entity by "being its bounds" then it seems to
> follow that any other entity does not *exist* to it and thus no
> relationship
> between entities can obtain.
> I admit that I have not read enough of Miller's work to see if he
> deals
> with this problem that I see in his reasoning (as applied here), but
> nevertheless the basic proposal that existence is sufficient to obtain
> anything that is even close to a notion of implementation.
>
> also see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/
>
> Implementation is a *process*, and as such we have to deal with the
> properties that are brought into our thinking on this.
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> BTW, Plato never gave an explanation that I have seen of how the Forms
> "cast
> imperfect shadows" or even why such "shadow casting" was necessary...
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Quentin Anciaux" <quentin.anciaux.domain.name.hidden>
> To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
> Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:06 PM
> Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
>
>
>
> Hi Hal,
>
> Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit :
>> What, after all, do these principles mean? They say that the
>> implementation substrate doesn't matter. You can implement a person
>> using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same. But if there is no
>> way
>> in principle to tell whether a system implements a person, then this
>> philosophy is meaningless since its basic assumption has no meaning.
>> The MWI doesn't change that.
>
> That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that
> physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision,
> there
> is no real "instantiation" even the UD itself does not need to be
> instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary.
>
> Quentin
>
> >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Thu Jun 22 2006 - 10:01:18 PDT