Stephen writes (BTW, thanks for using plain text :-)
> I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm
> itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for
> mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation
> in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that can
> be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have.
>
> AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any
> property, including properties that involve some notion of chance.
What properties do you have in mind that pure platonic algorithms seem to
lack? Anything, that is, besides *time* itself?
Thanks,
Lee
P.S. I am not up to speed on this thread at all.
> That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that
> physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision,
> there is no real "instantiation" even the UD itself does not need to be
> instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary.
>
> Quentin
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Received on Wed Jun 21 2006 - 21:49:44 PDT