And why do you want to restrict a 'person' to a cut view of its neurons
only?
Isn't a person (as anything) part of his ambience - in a wider view: of the
totality, with interction back and forth with all the changes that go on?
Are you really interested only in the dance of those silly neurons?
John M
----- Original Message -----
From: "Saibal Mitra" <smitra.domain.name.hidden>
To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:07 PM
Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons
>
> There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in terms
> of qualia. These qualia are ultimately defined by the way neurons are
> connected, but you could also think of persons in terms of the high-level
> algorithm, instead of the ''machine language'' level algorithm specified
by
> the neural network.
>
> The interpolation between two persons is more easily done in the high
level
> language. Then you do obtain a continuous path from one person to the
other.
> For each intermediary person, you can then try to ''compile'' the program
to
> the corresponding neural network.
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Jesse Mazer" <lasermazer.domain.name.hidden>
> To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
> Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2006 02:29 AM
> Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons
>
>
> >
> > Russell Standish wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > >
> > > > I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing
through
> > > > non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After
all,
> > > > there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a
> > > > fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in common
> > > > mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum.
> > > > However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that
> *if*
> > > > (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that
> your
> > >
> > >We need to be a bit more precise than "magically". In Parfit's book he
> > >talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in
> > >Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at
> > >present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and
> > >suffices for doing the teleporting experiment.
> > >
> > >The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely
> > >differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and
> > >connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain.
> >
> > I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a
nonfunctional
> > state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a
sort
> of
> > split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting
in
> > the same brain, without access to each other's thoughts and feelings.
But
> > this is probably not a fatal flaw in whatever larger argument he was
> making,
> > because you could modify the thought experiment to say something like
> "let's
> > assume that in the phase space of all possibe arrangements of neurons
and
> > synapses, there is some continuous path between my brain and Napoleon's
> > brain such that every intermediate state would have a single integrated
> > consciousness". There's no way of knowing whether such a path exists
(and
> of
> > course I don't have a precise definition of 'single integrated
> > consciousness'), but it seems at least somewhat plausible.
> >
> > Jesse
> >
> >
> >
> > >
>
>
> >
>
>
> --
> No virus found in this incoming message.
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>
>
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Received on Thu Jun 01 2006 - 11:29:18 PDT