Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 15 May 2006 11:17:35 +0200

Le 15-mai-06, à 02:04, Russell Standish a écrit :

>>
>> I guess it is a delicate point, a key point though, which overlaps the
>> ASSA/RSSA distinction (that is: the Absolute Self Sampling Assumption
>> versus the Relative Self Sampling Assumption).
>>
>> If you identify a "conscious first person history" with a "third
>> person
>> describable computation", it can be argued that an explanation for
>> physics can be given by Bayesian sort of anthropic reasoning based on
>> some universal probability distribution like Hall Finney's
>> Kolmogorovian UDist. Note tat this approach relies also on Church
>> Thesis. Here somehow the TOE will be a winning little program. I agree
>> that this would hunt away the third person white rabbits.
>
> I disagree. The UDist comes from looking at the measure induced on a
> set of descriptions

OK.


> (or computations if your prefer,

It is not the same. It changes the whole problem, especially from the
Relative SSA (Self-sampling assumption).



> although the two
> are not equivalent),


OK, why not taking that difference into account. I think it is a
crucial point.



> given a reference Turing machine U. This appears
> to be a 3rd person description, but it need not be so.


I am not sure I understand.



> As I have
> pointed out (but suspect it hasn't really sunk in yet), U can be
> taken to be the observer erself.


I could agree, but U cannot *know* e is U. Need some bet or act of
faith.
In general if U describes the observer, he is a "big" number in need of
an explanation. I mean, the existence of "big stable U" is what we try
to explain.


> When done this way, there is a 1st
> person "universal distribution", with a corresponding 1st person Occam
> razor theorem. And this implies the absence of 1st person white
> rabbits.


I really don't understand.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Received on Mon May 15 2006 - 05:18:50 PDT

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