--- Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:>
>
> Le 07-avr.-06, à 22:52, John M a écrit :
>
> >
> > I went to see your points 1-8, as suggested. I
> started
> > to read AT THE BEGINNING and got stupefait
> > (perplexed?) by your sentences.
>
> Which one? (If you are interested in an
> explanation).
>
it is the 'flow' of the text, the words you use are
not re-sounding in the same meaning and their
connection is not easily comprehensible by me.
(Your Gallic-English transition vs my
Hungarian-English perception). Could you write in
Hungarian?<G>)
>
> > First: I don't
> > appreciate thought experiments:
>
>
> All proof based on a theory are thought experiments,
> of course not all
> thought experiments are proof. The only way to
> decide what is the case
> can consist in following the argument and judiging
> by oneself.
>
I don't appreciate those 'proofs' either. (Popper?)
Most proving goes WITHIN the model viewed and limited
for the appropriate (!) application.
>
> > they are artifacts to
> > show something NOT TRUE and make 'the truth' shown
> by
> > it (eg. EPR). People love them because it leads
> > them into the world of HP.
> > People like fairytales. I like the ones I found
> out.
...
> > My eyes got glazed as I read on and less and less
> of
> > your words "matgerialized" into meaning. Then came
> a
> > cute figure (1) reminding me of Star Trek. I loved
> it
> > as an anusing fairy tale. Then less and less
> reading
> > occurred with conceptual following and more and
> more
> > 'scroll-down;.
> > This was not the first time I looked at your text.
> > This time I made up my mind that I want to stay
> with
> > it: I could not.
>
>
> No problem. Is it the comp hypothesis which makes
> problem for you?? It
> is my working hypothesis. All what I claim is that
> IF comp is correct
> THEN matter is not primitive, and its appearances
> can be justified from
> numbers and number theoretical relations (UDA), and
> then (but only
> then) I show that logic can help to find an
> effective way to derive
> laws of matter from laws of number.
You see, these concepts (comp, UDA) are your daily
bread, I have to stop and reconsider WHAT they really
may mean in my terms (worldview)? By the time I decide
that I think things differently, I am out of your
ideas.
Comp? I always considered it the - so far - best ways
the human mind could invent for reductionist thinking.
Reductionist it is because it goes digital, at least
in the 'numbers' of which I still wait for a
reasonable description of WHAT THEY MAY BE?
Matter? I grew into not believing in its - not as a
primitive, but as 'existing' at all -
"reasonableness": we (humanity over 6-12 millennia)
got impulses and explained all at the level of the
then contemporary cognitive inventory. It is an
incredible edifice what the "physical sciences model"
composed from the effects we congruently misunderstood
(hardness of solids etc.)
There is no 'matterly' in matter, the figments
(atoms?) make mathematical sense for physicists etc.
etc.
I could not formulate a concise hyp(othesis) so far.
You missed my main question: if it comes all from
'numbers' how and who and by what introduced FIRST the
non-number qualia? Do numbers imagine non-numbers?
(Think of the 2D Mr Square's world about the 3D
ideas).
Comp (usually) does not go into the infinite
variations vaiables, potentials, including Hal Ruhl's
list of everything, as IMO the totality should, so it
works with a limited model (just for 'comp').
((Now I might have disclosed my shameful erroneous
thinking.)) So if 'comp' is the best we so far
achieved, it is not necessarily the best for infinite
future development and all epistemic enrichment.
> I have no idea if comp is true or false, indeed all
> what I have done
> has been to show that comp can be made precise
> enough so that it
> becomes refutable (although it remains unprovable in
> case it is true).
Nevertheless it gives an air of righteousness.
>
> >
> > <snip>
> > HOW DO YOU FORMULATE NON-NUMBER CONCEPTS using
> > solely NUMBERS?
>
> By programming, or by Godel numbers, or by using
> some representation
> result. It is hard to be both clear and rigorous
> giving the subtleties
> involved in an intrinsic difficult subject.
This is not 'rigorous', it is fundamental. Numbers
churn out number-related results, and these are all
BEFORE the non-number related qualia first emerged.
Who and HOW brought them up FIRST?
>
> John, what is your opinion about comp? Would you
> accept a digital brain
> transplant? What about the weaker question: Would
> you accept your
> daughter or your son get married with some one
> having already said
> "yes" for a digital brain substitution?
Friends of mine work with brain-computer chimeras to
make blind persons see and deaf persons hear. I find
it quite acceptable, like a pair of crutches for
walking.
If the computer-input gives beneficial
characteristics, not only substitutions for missing
features, it can be considered as a velociped helping
to run faster than on foot. If you speak a foreign
language, you use a dictionary. Why not build it into
your brainfunction?
It is a 'moral' question what I reject principally: I
don't like those highly 'moral' cultures, in which the
priests ate the sacrificed girls. All other cultures
have questionable morales, except for our own, which
we got used (brainwashed) to and accepted.
So it may be frightening that a family member is
smarter, faster, broaderminded than we could muster,
but so are the astronauts with their machines.
It was the joke of the Dalai Lama a decade ago that AI
could produce reincarnation into a computer. Today it
is reality (or the perception of it).
>
> Bruno
>
John
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Received on Mon Apr 10 2006 - 19:12:42 PDT