Le 07-avr.-06, à 17:46, 1Z a écrit :
> To be precise, there is no problem with a very basic, simple notion of
> bare substance being the substrate, the bearer, of phenomenal
> properties as well
> as physical properties.
Are you aware of the mind body problem. Are you aware the problem is
still open.
> if you assume comutationalism (as a I undertand it, not as you
> understand it)
> you are already assuming
> the existence of matter, since computers are material. ...
You just tell me that you are the one assuming that computers are
material, so your are begging the question.
> The slide from idealism to solipsis is inevitable.
Pythagoras and Plato already showed counterexamples. If numbers
generate a "video-game" sort of reality, the game could still a priori
be sharable, unless you prove the contrary.
> If the existence of
> matter
> is not needed to explain my experiences, the existence of other
> experiencers
> with their own experiences is not neeed to explain my experience
> either.
Possible, but not necessary. Other minds appears in comp through the
notion of first person plural, (arising from the duplication of entire
population of individuals) and this leads to a notion of "arithmetical
entanglement". Actually theory like Shmidhuber or Hal Finney UDIST,
could probably justify the existence of genuine other minds, and this
despite they are lacking the 1/3 distinction povs. They suppress
nevertheless successfully the 3 person white rabbits, and this
explains, I guess for them, the negligible probability that someone
behaving like a human is a zombie.
The 1/3 distinction needs a more detailed treatment and the question is
obviously still open. Please follow your intuition if you believe you
could find a contradiction in comp, as I understand it. I mean you
could be right, but until now, you don't really argue in your posts.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Mon Apr 10 2006 - 10:45:41 PDT