> > however, as a person's local environment might plausibly contain a
> > computer which modeled their local environment and predicted their
> > behaviour. so the model would actually have to model itself,
>
> Why assume the computer is part of the person's environment?
because it might be.
> >now
> > having to recalculate what the subject will do after every calculation
>
> Why assume the calculation is communicated to the person?
because if it was then it would invalidate the prediction.
presenting the prediction to an agent to resented being predicted
would invalidate the prediction and thus demonstrate the freewill of
the agent.
playing poker i would be rewarded for predicting your behaviour,
folding when you have the nutts and calling when you bluff, but my
success negatively reinforces your predictability.
> Actually, in some circumstances you can predict what a person will do. Does
> that somehow prevent them from doing it or deny them "freewill" (whatever that
> is). See the Grey Walter experiment for an interesting example.
yes, if knowledge of that prediction can not alter that person's
behaviour, then they do not have freewill about that thing. like
breathing, or eating, i can choose what i eat but not that i eat. the
will is free but not arbitary.
okay, so if they can be predicted in secret, and the prediction
confirmed after the fact -> then they are deterministic
okay, so if they can be predicted in secret, but the prediction cannot
be confirmed after the fact if the subject has knowledge of it -> then
have freewill.
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Received on Thu Apr 06 2006 - 21:47:55 PDT