Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 01-avr.-06, à 00:46, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >
> >> And read perhaps the literature on the mind body problem: all
> >> materialist approaches has failed, and then the result I got explains
> >> what it should be so.
> >
> > I have my own analysis of the problem: the words "map" and "territory"
> > feature.
>
>
> All right but sometime map are continuously or computationally embedded
> in the territory, and so there is a fixed point where the point of the
> map coincide with the point of the territory: typically yhe indexical
> "where you are", both with respect to the territory and its mapped
> representation.
That's still isomorphism. What I mean is that there is no
problem in the concept that matter can be conscious. The
problem is in finding consicousness in 3rd-person descriptions of
matter.
> The same, somehow, when you say "yes" to the comp doctor. It is not a
> model of the functioning of your brain that he will put in your head,
> it is, by hypothesis and/or act of faith, a digitally equivalent
> substitution.
>
>
>
> >
> >> Actually you could perhaps explain how do you think a machine is able
> >> to distinguish a material (physical) reality from an immaterial
> >> (arithmetical) reality.
> >
> > The same way I can.
>
>
> Perhaps.
> Perhaps you can. But I can't take this assertion as a (third person)
> argument. Because with comp the old dream metaphysical argument extend
> itself on arithmetical truth, so that I suspect you cannot pretend you
> can and remain at the same time a sound entity.
The dream/solipsism only works if you can account for the realtively
constrained nature of perceived reality.
>
>
>
> > What can be thought (logical possibility)
> > is much broader than what is observed.
>
>
> Indeed. The point is that with comp, what can be observed emerges from
> what can be thought.
> Not by humans, but by universal machines (or sub-universal one, but
> don't want be technic here).
Hmmm. Maybe.
> > Therefore, there are
> > constraints -- matter, laws, etc.
>
>
> Any sound theorem prover machine can already prove that in order to
> singularize any observable token related to her, she will need an
> infinity of such constraints.
I have no idea what you mean by that. I don't regard constraints as
being chosen by observers; observers are as subject to the gravity the
same as anything else.
> Observation can only be partial filtration (by comp). Physical
> realities emerge from coherence conditions on machine's dreams overlap;
> where dream = "computation" as "seen" from some first-person (plural)
> point of view, and then, the emergence is related to the way those
> point-of-views glue with each others. Theoretical computer science and
> modal logic makes this precise and testable (see my url if you are
> interested).
>
> It seems you believe that the realist modal or other arithmetical
> realist inflations of possibilities are unsolvable without invoking a
> sort of ad-hoc god, a *physical* universe,
As I am forever pointing out, all theories have some ad-hoc element.
> but my feeling is that you
> underestimated the subtlety of the relation between numbers. The fact
> is that there already exist mathematical tools which help to formulate
> such problems, and the incompleteness phenomena makes those questions
> not so easy.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Sat Apr 01 2006 - 12:19:54 PST